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The growing use of mobile web services such as electronic health records systems and 
applications like twitter, Facebook has increased interest in robust mechanisms for ensuring 
security for such information sharing services. Common security mechanisms such as access 
control and information flow control are either restrictive or weak in that they prevent 
applications from sharing data usefully, and/or allow private information leaks when used 
independently. Typically, when services are composed there is a resource that some or all of the 
services involved in the composition need to share. However, during service composition 
security problems arise because the resulting service is made up of different services from 
different security domains. A key issue that arises and that we address in this thesis is that of 
enforcing secure information flow control during service composition to prevent illegal access 
and propagation of information between the participating services. This thesis describes a model 
that combines access control and information flow control in one framework. We specifically 
consider a case study of an e-health service application, and consider how constraints like 
location and context dependencies impact on authentication and authorization. Furthermore, we 
consider how data sharing applications such as the e-health service application handle issues of 
unauthorized users and insecure propagation of information in resource constrained 
environments1. Our framework addresses this issue of illegitimate information access and 
propagation by making use of the concept of program dependence graphs (PDGs). Program 
dependence graphs use path conditions as necessary conditions for secure information flow 
control. The advantage of this approach to securing information sharing is that, information is 
only propagated if the criteria for data sharing are verified. 
Our solution proposes or offers good performance, fast authentication taking into account 
bandwidth limitations. A security analysis shows the theoretical improvements our scheme 
offers. Results obtained confirm that the framework accommodates the CIA-triad (which is the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability model designed to guide policies of information 
security) of our work and can be used to motivate further research work in this field.  
 
  
                                                          
1
 Resource constrained environments are characterized by infrastructural limitations that impact negatively on 
computation efficiency and effectiveness. Examples arise in disaster management scenarios, war-torn zones, and 
rural or remote areas. 
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Rapid advances in web service technologies, has generated more interest for applications to be 
available for users wherever they are. However, in a developing world context, the provisioning 
of these web services is heavily reliant on the type of computing devices available to the vast 
majority of users. Hence, due to the scarcity of big resource computing devices like personal 
computers (PCs), mobile devices like cellular or smart phones and tablets become a default 
solution in these (developing) environments. However, these mobile devices face a challenge of 
being resource constrained compared to their traditional counterparts like personal computers. 
Constraints like computational power and bandwidth bring about their limitations as far as 
performance related functions are concerned.  This chapter presents the background and 
motivation of studying access and information flow control to secure mobile web service 
compositions in resource constrained environments and the challenges they face in as far as 
adhering to security policies is concerned. It also presents the contributions of the work and 
finally the structure or layout of the thesis. 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The evolution of the Internet in recent years has sparked a growing popularity for information 
sharing applications. Information sharing applications allow users to interact without necessarily 
needing to store data on the device used for communication. Furthermore, applications such as 
Facebook2, MySpace3, and Flickr4 support this idea of information availability anytime and 
anywhere. 
The Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) concept and more recently, Cloud computing, provide 
a framework for building applications to enable information sharing across multiple security 
domains. In SOA environments, services can be composed to form new applications, by 









combining the software functionalities of services belonging to different domains. An added 
advantage of service compositions is that information can be combined from different sources, 
flexibly, using a set of policies (rules) to respond to queries. 
Typically, service composition becomes necessary when there is a resource that some or all of 
the services involved in the composition need to share. For instance, consider an electronic 
health records system that consists of three outsourced databases namely, “chronic illnesses”, 
“allergies”, and “patient details” (e.g. date of birth, race and gender). Access to this data needs to 
be flexible so that queries can return responses without revealing any more information than is 
necessary (i.e. only the requested or required information is released and no other information 
revealed). In addition, since the information is sensitive, care must be taken to ensure that data 
security and privacy are always guaranteed. Therefore, the queries being run on the database 
must be checked to verify that the responses returned are consistent with the rules in the security 
policy in order to control the flow of information. Moreover, downloaded information needs to 
be tracked to ensure that it is always manipulated in ways that conform to the security policy 
regardless of where and who made the download request.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
This research is based on the security problems that arise whenever service compositions occur. 
Basically, when service compositions occur, a global security policy that satisfies the minimum 
security requirements of each of the participating services must be formed. This typically 
requires mapping the role of the user behind the service call to an equivalent role within the 
target domain. All program executions resulting in the composed service must occur in ways that 
abide by the underlying security policies of each of the participating services. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that security policies can change during service 
composition. In addition, this policy change is because the composite service is made up of 
different services from different security domains with different security policies. Therefore, 
these services have to agree on the security policy to follow and this can change some security 
policies of some services because their dominant security policies can be overlooked. Therefore, 
in order to enforce secure information flow control during service compositions we need to 
consider how to prevent illegal access and flow of information between the participating 
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services. This becomes difficult when each service has a unique access and information flow 
control policy that the service complies to. Hence, a global security (access and information flow 
control) policy has to be defined for all the participating services to satisfy. 
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis 
In as much as research in access control and information flow control has gained momentum 
over the years, few works make use of both security techniques in the same context especially in 
web service environments. Also, there is little work that looks at information flow control 
policies and access control in mobile web service environments. The thesis presents a novel 
approach in this regard. This work exposes the problem of unlawful access and propagation of 
information during service compositions, brought up by participating services from different 
security domains having to agree on a global security policy to conform to during composition. 
Similarly, based on this, the work’s novelty addresses location and context dependencies in 
authentication and authorizations for information flow control in mobile services or resource 
constrained environments. The principal contribution of this thesis is the design and 
implementation of an access control scheme that takes into account location and context 
attributes for secure authentication and authorization to resources. Access to resources is subject 
to users and/or services’ location and context being referenced as input for access control 
decisions. In addition we use the concept of program dependence graphs to enforce legitimate 
information propagation between services so that all information shared between services is 
permissible and verified. This is attainable by making use of path conditions which needs to be 
satisfied first for the flow of information to take place. Consequently, we propose a solution that 
offers fast authentication and good performance taking into account bandwidth limitations in the 
mobile web service environment. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The remainder of the work is organized as follows (Figure 1.1); Chapter 2 details our research 
interest and defines the problem by providing background information and a conceptual 
examination of related work, specifically, an introduction to Information Flow Control (IFC) and 
Access Control schemes. Both IFC and Access Control are the major motivation behind the work 
presented herein as no work has addressed both techniques in the same context in mobile web 
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service environments. The threat model and its implementation are found in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
presents the formal definition of the approach taken in designing the research. It contains the 
design chosen, and the system and security prototype design aspect of the work. In Chapter 5 we 
present the implementation of the work. Analyses of results are discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, 
Chapter 7 concludes the work and offers a direction for future work. 
 
 






Background and Related 
Work 
As a preamble, research on Information Flow Control (IFC) has over the years received abundant 
attention due to its significant role in securing web services or Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) environments. Furthermore, in recent times, the high mobility of users and services in the 
emerging mobile applications (mobile web services) has called for stringent security mechanisms 
to be put in place to guarantee consumers or users information is secure both in storage and 
transaction. In principle, such security mechanisms used include Information Flow Control, 
which denotes the security of a software system with respect to a security specification, 
particularly enforcing information flow policies that guarantee desirable transfer of information 
in a given process from a variable a to a variable b. Also this largely borders on three security 
properties, confidentiality, integrity and availability. Access control on the other hand has also 
been primarily used to address these three security properties. The confidentiality aspect in 
access control is addressed by making use of authentication and authorization while IFC has 
taken care of the integrity aspect. Over the years, there has been a largely renewed interest in 
addressing these two security properties in the same context. This chapter presents some 
background or previous work done on different kinds of security techniques that relate to this 
thesis, mainly focusing on information flow control and access control. The need to monitor how 
information propagates between services and/or users is of paramount importance in ensuring a 
smooth secure flow of information. The following section gives a background of mobile web 






2.1 Mobile Web Services 
A Web service as defined by [104] is an application that can be accessible by being 
automatically discovered and invoked by other applications and humans. Generally, these 
services are applications that are autonomous, self-describing and integrated that can be 
published, located and invoked as and when required on the Web. However, when these services 
are accessible from a handheld mobile device which is connected to a mobile network or other 
wireless network through the Internet, they are referred to as Mobile web services [31]. 
However, the term Mobile Web Services is not clearly defined. It is used in different domains 
with different meanings. Hence, in this thesis Mobile Web Services define the area where web 
services are applications that are accessible from a mobile device connected to a wireless 
network or mobile network. In short, a Mobile Web Service is a Web service that is deployed on 
a mobile device and connected through a wireless network. 
Since mobile web services differ from a more traditional web service application, as a result, the 
constraints imposed by the limitations of the device, in terms of limited user interface, low 
processing power and often low bandwidth will influence access and information flow control in 
this environment. [84] considers that the influence of the constraints is much more visible when 
the mobile web services collaborate to create or form a high level business process. This 
collaboration is formally referred to as composition. The following section gives some 
background on mobile web service compositions. 
2.1.1 Web Service Compositions 
Web Services Composition as defined above is a method to connect together different available 
web services to create a high-level business process. It involves assembling atomic or candidate 
web services to provide functionalities that are not available at design times. As a result, a new 
functionality can be developed through reusing of components that are already available, but 
unable to accomplish a task on their own.  
Different works have evaluated web service compositions by looking at the different problems 
affecting their compositions. [73] addresses in detail the problem of incorporating web service 
discovery and composition; however they only consider simple workflows where web services 
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have one input and one output parameter. In their work, the web service composition blueprint is 
regulated to a sequence of limited web services corresponding to a linear workflow of web 
services. The proposed solution recovers a sequence of causal links between web services, as a 
result, a linear and total order of services making up the required composed service. Proposing a 
similar solution to [73] above, [105] uses a composition path that is made up of a series of 
operators that calculate data, and connectors that provide data passage between the operators. A 
shortest path algorithm on the graph of the operator space is used to search for possible operators 
to create a sequence. Even so, only two kinds of services (connector and operator) with one input 
and output parameter are considered, meaning only the simplest case of service composition is 
presented. Presenting a contrary view, [84] proposes workflows with services having more than 
one input and output parameters.  
In [61] a formalism and modeling tool called interface automata is proposed to represent web 
services and perform compositions. Their work presents atomic services being stored as a graph 
where each node resembles input and output parameters and edges represent web services. Each 
web service contains a description of its inputs, outputs, and dependencies of other web services. 
Web service descriptions and the graph are used to discover composition results that satisfy a 
service request. Given that several compositions can be found, the work offers no optimization 
mechanism for selecting the desired requested composition. However, out of all the matching 
several requested composition, nonetheless, the most suitable composition will still be selected. 
An interesting path is taken by [42] by introducing a composer to perform web service 
composition. The composer requires the end user to select web services for each activity in the 
composition and to create how the path linking the web services is specified. After selecting a 
web service, the web services that can create an output that could be used as an input of the 
selected service are listed, after filtering based on profile descriptions. Ideally, the user can 
manually choose the service that he deems proper for a particular activity. After all the services 
are selected, the system generates a composite process. The composition is effected by calling 
each service individually, and passing the results between services according to the flow 
specifications.  
Consequently, during composition, data exchanged and shared between the web services needs 
to be protected from malicious users who could be eavesdropping or unauthorized to access the 
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service. The following section gives the background of the techniques used to safeguard against 
the unwanted information propagation and access in web service compositions.  
 
2.2 Information Flow Control 
Information Flow Control (IFC) [28] is a technique that asserts the security of a software system 
with respect to a security specification. It is a technique that asserts that data or information 
disseminates in a proper and secure way in a system. In general, information flow policies are 
used as mechanisms to enforce information flow control. These mechanisms which include Run-
time mechanisms, tag data with information flow labels, have been employed at the operating 
system level and at the programming language level. Static program analyses have also been 
established or initiated that ensure information flows within programs do conform to policies set. 
While information flow has been largely or intensively researched in the last decade, [28] 
observes that the methods for checking security policies only have an effect on a very restricted 
part of a program analysis technology, commonly type systems. When compared to standard 
security practices, IFC gives an explanation for program semantics. [9] gives two principal ways 
or sources of information flow in programs; explicit flows which are simply direct flows of 
information resulting from assignment operations and Input/Output (I/O) statements and implicit 
flows; which may arise when the control flow is affected by secret values or signal information 
through the control structure of a program. 
In this section we discuss and analyze various mechanisms used to address the issue of security 
in information flow control, taking into account the important aspect of information flow 
security, which is the preservation of integrity of information.  
2.2.1 Noninterference 
As noted by Daniel Hedin and Andrei Sabelfeld [36], the fundamental basic logical concept of 
secure information flow is noninterference. Several authors [28], [9], [91] define noninterference 
as an idea that confidential data may not interfere with (or affect) public data. Hammer [28] 
contends that the most noteworthy illustration of a security policy that put in force 
noninterference involves that the secret input of a program may not flow to public output; in 
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effect, public output may not even be influenced or subjected from secret input. Noninterference 
affirms confidentiality in the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) – triad [28].  This 
is appropriate in terms of formalization or validation; however, it can be regarded as too limiting 
or restrictive because, in certain cases programs need to disclose confidential information in 
order to deliver their intended purpose. [9], [28] give an example of a program that needs to 
write the Boolean outcome of an if statement that contains high level confidential or secret data. 
Even though the return output can be false, it would have partially leaked that the argument (s) in 
the statement are sensitive or not. 
 It is however, worth noting that a lot of research in this field has been focused towards 
modifying the definition of noninterference to support more realistic usage scenarios or even 
using different designs to secure information flow. Smith [44] proposes a definition of 
probabilistic noninterference in which it is required that the initial values of high security 
variables cannot affect the joint probability distribution of the possible final values of any low 
security variables. Rossi et al. [91] proposes a concept of noninterference for multi-level service 
compositions and they argue that SOAs are increasingly relying on complex distributed systems 
that share information with multiple levels of security. In these systems, [91] argue that 
information with mixed security levels is processed and directed to particular clients. This makes 
the system’s security exposed to adversary participants because secret or confidential 
information is passed to participants whose clearance level to access this type of information is 
undetermined. Hence, they define noninterference for service compositions presenting 
stipulations that public synchronizations are not affected or changed as confidential 
communications are varied or, in a more general way that the way the composition behaves in its 
low level (public non sensitive level) is independent from the behavior of its high level 
(sensitive-confidential) components. As a result, clients are guaranteed that the passage of the 
data over the internet to a web server remains confidential or it cannot be intercepted and 
understood by unwanted listeners [91].  
Taking the contrary view, Laud [75] defines secure information flow in terms of computational 
indistinguishability rather than noninterference. He argues that the general objective is to prove 
that an adversary or attacker cannot learn anything about the confidential inputs of a program by 
observing its public output. Since real adversaries are resource bounded, computational 
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indistinguishability assumes an adversary is working in probabilistic polynomial time, where 
polynomial means polynomial in a suitable security parameter such as the encryption key length 
[20]. Other works [40], [44], [46] propose models of classifying general features of services that 
may influence the security of information flow. They also define transformation factors which 
measure how possible the output of a service can be used to obtain the input and/or the local data 
used in the computation of the service. They also discuss the honest hypothesis of unreliability or 
untrustworthiness regarding service composers. They argue that service composers may not 
always be fully trusted because web services may be provided by different domains under 
different security administrators. Thus, individual composers may not meet certain security 
requirements (like authentication and authorization) and may not fully be trusted by all the 
service providers. Hence the introduction of intended procedures for the service composer to 
relate with security authorities for distant policy examination and negotiation, resulting in very 
resolute and flexible policy validation processes. Mantel and Sabelfeld [48] explore a timing-
sensitive security property for multithreaded programs, later drawn-out to the distributed 
environment. Sabelfeld and Sands [10] considers probabilistic bisimulation based designs of 
confidentiality for multi-threaded programs, focusing on formulations for timing- and 
probability-sensitive confidentiality. They stem relationships between scheduler specific, 
scheduler independent and strong confidentiality. Work by Roscoe [17] also investigates 
confidentiality properties in a process-calculus setting. A concept of low-view determinism is 
presented, which demands that abstracted publicly observable outcomes are deterministic and, 
accordingly, independent of secret inputs. The above works have explored different platforms in 
addressing secure information flow, particularly in multithreaded environments other than 
noninterference. The following section, details another IFC approach, declassification in 
addressing the secure flow of information. 
2.2.2 Declassification 
Declassification [5] is the lowering of a security organization or categorization of selected 
information. And for many applications, a complete separation between secret and public 
information/data is too narrowing or constricting. There are four different latitudes of 
declassification as identified by Sabelfeld et al [10]. They include what is declassified, who is 
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able to declassify, where the declassification occurs and when the declassification takes place. 
Hedin and Sabelfeld [36] define the dimensions of declassification as follows; 
 What: asserts the importance of being able to specify what information is being 
declassified, e.g. the last 4 digits of an identity number. Policies for fractional release 
must guarantee an upper limit on what information is released. 
 Who: asserts the importance of who controls the release of information? This refer to 
information integrity – if the attacker is able to control what information is made public 
he might be able to mount a laundry attack, i.e., accidental disclosures concealed by the 
systems declassification policy. 
 Where: there are two forms of release locality identified by the researchers. Relating to 
the what and when dimensions, the where dimension is the most intermediate 
interpretation of where in terms of code locality. The other form is level locality, 
describing where information may flow relative to the security of the system. 
 When asserts the temporal aspect of declassification pertaining to when the information 
is released or leaked. Sabelfeld et al. [36] identify three classes of temporal release 
classifications, Time-complexity based, Probabilistic and Relative. The two former are 
related. Time-complexity based states that information will not be released until, at the 
earliest, after a certain time; typically as an asymptotic notion relative to the size of the 
secret. With probabilistic considerations one can talk about the possibility of a leak being 
very small. The class of relative temporal policies is on the other hand related to program 
correctness. It controls when declassification can occur relative to other (possibly 
abstract) events in the system. For example:  “downgrading of a software key may occur 
after confirmation of payment has been received”. 
2.3 Approaches for Information Flow analysis 
Several authors have contended that, once secure information is released, it may be disclosed 
maliciously or even accidentally through a bug in a program. Therefore, in order to safeguard 
that such security policy is followed, it is important to look at how information propagates 
through the program. Given the complexity of modern computing systems, it is not possible to 
manually examine the flow of information. Language-based methods [9] are generally used by 
design to efficiently analyze the flow of information within a program so that end-to-end security 
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policies may be enforced. Hammer and Sabelfeld et al. [28], [9] explore two prominent 
information flow analysis techniques or approaches; dynamic analysis and static analysis. The 
next section covers these approaches in detail. 
 
2.3.1 Information Flow Analysis 
According to Hammer [28], information flow control can be achieved online when a program 
executes or offline (often at compile time). The following techniques present the two ways to 
achieve IFC during program execution and/or at compile time. 
2.3.1.1 Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis attempts to analyze information flow within a program while it is executing. 
One approach includes Bell and LaPadula’s [30] mandatory access control. In this approach, 
each data element is labeled with a security level. Information flow is controlled dynamically by 
increasing the ordinary computations within a running program to instantly compute the label 
that will control the future propagation of the data. In general, performance monitoring 
approaches are not well suitable for analyzing information flow. Run-time analysis mechanisms 
only have information available about how a program is behaving in a single execution. In 
addition [40], such mechanisms do not have sufficient information to predict future steps the 
system might take. On the contrary, the analysis of information flow in mobile code programs 
requires a dynamic approach. Work by Focardi and Rossi [79] in particular explore the problem 
of enforcing security properties for programs, such as mobile agents, whose environment will 
change at run-time. Their approach is to ensure that every state reachable in the system satisfies a 
non-interference property. 
2.3.1.2 Static Analysis 
Static analysis on the other hand attempts to analyze the information prior to the execution of a 
program, often at compile time. Hammer [28], [29] ascertains that if the program can be 
confirmed, no program execution can reveal illegal information flow, hence avoiding the 
overhead of runtime checks. However, Sabelfeld et al. [11] implores that precise static IFC 
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analysis is undecidable, so all static analyses need to be conservative. Works by Denning et al. 
[33], [35] and later Volpano [45] fall under this approach. There are two major categories of 
static analysis approach as observed by different authors [5], [9], [75]; Approaches that use type 
systems and those that use programming language semantics [35]. Furthermore, according to 
Hammer, type systems do not exploit the whole range of contemporary program analysis; hence, 
they suffer from restrictive languages and a high annotation burden.  
In order to remedy the above mentioned short comings of type systems (contemporary program 
analysis and high annotation burden), Hammer et al [28, 29], presents a new approach based on 
program slicing and the system dependence graph. In general, it extends the algorithm for 
program slicing to allow for precise information flow control and provide a means to downgrade 
secret information, if necessary. The works [28], [29] explore the idea that path conditions 
provide further understanding into how one statement influences another. Therefore, they may 
lead to conditions for illegal information flow, or they may provide confirmation that a presumed 
flow is impossible. The contrary view taken by Hammer [28] is a novel approach for information 
flow control which uses system/program dependence graphs (PDGs). Hammer argues that the 
flow-sensitivity, context-sensitivity, and object-sensitivity of his slicing program method extends 
naturally to information flow control and thus excels over the leading approach, which is security 
type systems. 
Despite the advances reviewed above, security type systems have still not been used much 
because the notion of noninterference is difficult to attain in practice for various reasons, like 
covert channels and declassification whereby confidential information may be partially leaked in 
data aggregation. For example [48], consider for instance a program that computes average 
salaries, even though each individual salary is private, we might want to publish the average 
salary. Therefore, other research avenues have been explored over the years in trying to bridge 
the gap of securing type systems to enable them to be used in securing service compositions. 
Consequently, recent research has considered various channels in securing the flow of 
information in service compositions. One way to introduce flexibility [54] is to consider type 
systems for information flow that take access control into account.  The next section will cover 




2.4 Access Control Schemes for Secure Information Flow  
 As history and research will discover through their usage, standard access control mechanisms 
as stand-alone mechanisms, only control the release of information but not its propagation once 
access has been granted. This holds true for Discretionary Access Control (DAC), because, 
although it is effective for specifying security requirements and is also easier to implement in 
practice, its inability to control information flow implies that it is not well suited to the context of 
web-based shared applications where control in some form is required [71]. DAC models also 
suffer from being vulnerable to Trojan Horse attacks. Trojan Horse attacks are driven by 
deceiving valid users into accepting to run code that then allows a malicious user to get access to 
information on the system. 
While on the other hand Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [60], [71] counters these threats by 
governing access centrally. Hence, an ordinary user cannot change access rights a user has with 
respect to a file, and once logged on the system, the rights he/she has are always assigned to all 
the files he/she creates. This formula [62] allows the system to use the concept of information 
flow control to provide additional security. Information flow control allows the access control 
system to monitor the ways and types of information that are propagated from one user to 
another. A security system that implements information flow control usually categorizes users 
into security classes as noted by Denning [9], and all the valid channels along which information 
can flow between the classes are regulated by a central authority. MAC models are typically 
designed using the concept of information flow control. 
 Previous work by Banerjee et al. [7] studied access control mechanisms in relation to stack 
inspection, and established a connection between authorization of information access and the 
subsequent flow of the information. They concluded that the noninterference property guarantees 
that the access control mechanism is serving correctly to enforce flow policy, in a way that once 
access has been granted, there is no subsequent leak of secret of the information. More work by 
Banerjee et al. slightly similar but different to the above, encompasses how dynamic access 
control can allow flexible program interfaces where a data channel can be used for more than one 
purpose, while ensuring confidentiality. They consider the access control mechanism of Java [8] 
as defined by J. Gough which aims to protect trusted system code. The principals that are granted 
permissions in an access policy are programs rather than, say, processes or users as in an 
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operating system security. They also deliberate on programs that use access control to enforce 
information flow policy expressed by labeling of input and output channels with levels in a 
lattice as defined by Bell & L. LaPadula [48] and Denning [9]. Unlike stack inspection, the 
conclusion is that the mechanism itself introduces a new channel of information flow, but one 
that can be controlled using the same sort of type-and-effect analysis that was previously 
developed for stack inspection. As with previous work [54], the analysis validates code with 
respect to a given policy. And in this respect, policy defines both trust and confidentiality levels. 
Total trust in access control systems has in countless scenarios always been a potential threat to 
information security brought about by system administrators. The evolution of traditional access 
control has seen this gap being marginally closed by more flexible and dominant systems like 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [81] and Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF). Other 
access control models like Cryptographic Access Control (CAC) [79] have been used to enforce 
access control because of their consideration or use of data encryption, hence, unauthorized 
access is more difficult because the data remains encrypted no matter where it is located, and 
only a valid key can be used to decrypt it. An example is the enforcement of hierarchical 
encryption models to enhance access control mechanisms. One particular work to cryptographic 
solutions to a problem of access control in a hierarchy is a solution presented by Akl and Taylor 
[58]. The authors introduce a scheme based on cryptography for access control in a system where 
hierarchy is represented by a partially ordered set (poset). Its application is direct, requiring users 
highly placed in the hierarchy to store or keep a large number of cryptographic keys. A time-
versus-storage trade- off is then defined for addressing this key management problem. The 
scheme enables a member of an organization at some level of the hierarchy to derive from his 
own cryptographic key the keys of members below him in the hierarchy, and therefore to have 
access to information encrypted under those keys. This solution is interesting because, the 
protection it offers against illegal disclosure depends neither on the physical security of the 
storage medium where the information is kept nor on the trustworthiness of the people managing 
it. It also accommodates not only files that are stored in a central computer memory, but also to 
messages broadcast on a communication network. Anyone with the proper receiving tools can 
intercept the message but has access to the information it contains only if in ownership of the 
right key. Basically, the need of access control in a hierarchy arises in several different contexts, 
one of which is managing the information flow for an organization where, the users are divided 
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into different security classes depending on their access needs. Several cryptographic solutions 
[15], [80] have been recommended to address this problem – and the solutions are based on 
generating cryptographic keys for each class such that, the key for a lower level security class 
depends on the key for the security class that is higher up in the hierarchy. A different approach 
is taken by Sylvia Osborn and Yuxia Guo [58] focuses on modeling users in role-based access 
control to enforce access control in role hierarchy encryption models and simultaneously reduce 
redundant user-role assignments.  
Therefore, standard methods of enforcing access control in web-based applications include those 
supported by Cryptographic Key Management (CKM). One standard characteristic presented by 
the above scheme [87] is that as a Cryptographic Access Control (CAC) scheme, it has to rely on 
or be supported by Cryptographic Key Management (CKM) schemes to execute proficiently. 
And unlike authentication schemes that rely on system specific security policies, CAC schemes 
do not rely on the physical security on which the data is stored as observed by Akl et al [87]. 
Instead they rely on KM algorithms that place a heavy processing cost on the system. And this 
has resulted in their unpopularity in web applications. 
Consequently, to alleviate this problem one has to enforce cryptographically controlled access to 
stored data by encrypting it with a single secret key that is then dispersed to the users requiring 
access [14], [15]. Data security is then achieved by replacing the group key and re-encrypting the 
affected data whenever group membership changes. However, key management (KM) is 
expensive when changes in group membership occur frequently and involve large amounts of 
data. Kayem et al [15], [16] presents a framework based on the autonomic computing paradigm 
that allows a KM scheme to continually monitor the rate at which changes in group membership 
happens and generate keys as well as encrypted replicas to guard against future changes to 
address this problem. Therefore, since the keys and encrypted data are generated by anticipation 
rather than on demand, the long-term cost of KM is reduced. The framework comes with 
functionalities that are organized into six components; the sensor, monitor, analyzer, planner, 
executor and effector, that are interconnected to form a feedback control loop (FBCL). The 
function of the FBCL is to continuously monitor the arrival rate of rekey requests at the key 
server and, at regular intervals, calculates an acceptable resource (keys and encrypted replicas) 
allocation plan to reduce the overall cost of rekeying. The underlying benefit of the scheme is 
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that each component of it adds to the improvement of a standard CKM scheme’s performance 
without changing its principal characteristics. The proper implementation of this framework 
guarantees confidentiality and/or integrity in the data being protected or secured. Likewise, 
service compositions should assure clients or users of their unconditional trustworthiness in 
guaranteeing confidentiality and/or integrity in their services, which is the underlying property of 
all security aware systems. 
Accordingly, the combined use of Internet, the Web and mobile technologies (e.g. mobile 
devices, mobile and wireless communication – mobile web services as described in Section 2.1) 
makes it possible for users to connect to remote resources and services from a wide range of 
settings. This combination of resources and services found in mobile and wireless 
communication is commonly known as mobile web services [104]. Even though the focal 
motivation of such environments and connectivity is to increase the availability of information 
and services to users, security is also an important requirement.  Several applications that benefit 
from mobility and improved connectivity need to access sensitive information and services that 
need to be adequately protected. Thus, securing the flow of information and resources in such 
settings involves not only protecting network communications, but also providing strong 
authentication and access control, as they are crucial to secure the end-points of computing 
infrastructures and to make sure that information and services are used according to the 
organizational policies and legal requirements [18]. The need for relevant access control models 
in such environments is essential, taking into account the dynamicity and complexity of the 
environments these applications are deployed in. One such access control model appropriate for 
these types of settings is location based access control (LBAC). Generally, LBAC [24] models 
regulate access of a subject to an object, considering only the location of the subject. Denning et 
al. [32] asserts that Location-based Access Control (LBAC) schemes integrate traditional access 
control mechanisms (DAC, MAC, RBAC) with access conditions based on the physical position 
of users and other attributes related to the users’ location. Therefore, LBAC takes the location of 
the user and the time of the request into account in order to decide whether to grant or deny an 
access request. Other works [25], [27] evaluate LBAC as a double pronged scheme in the way it 
uses location information for authentication. As observed by [67], the first is to use the location 
as one element in the authentication process or incorporate location in the security policy. This in 
turn prompts the user to provide more authentication proofs as a result of location being used as 
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a multi-factor authentication. The above method yields drawbacks like having untrustworthy 
users who deliberately do not give or report their location. As a result, the design must consist of 
mechanisms that inhibit the user from falsifying this information.  Secondly, location is used to 
determine the security policy whereby the location information is external to the policy. This is 
observed for instance, when a user is connecting to his company’s network from home. In this 
case, he may be required to provide more credentials than when he is connecting from the office. 
Hence, the use of location information being separate to the policy specified. 
A majority of the works [51], [52], [66] evaluate LBAC models by considering both subject and 
object dynamics. However, emphasis is paid on the fundamental notion that location in these 
models or schemes describes where the user is accessing information from. The location 
information is used in numerous types of authorization rules. One type uses location to find the 
trust domain where the user is accessing information services from. A reasonable policy would 
deny access to any sensitive information to anyone accessing it from such areas. Furthermore, 
location can also be used to develop the emergency level of access, for instance, a policy can 
allow read access to all images of all patients for any user assigned to the role physician and 
accessing the information from an emergency room. 
Consequently, other works monitor access to resources by evaluating attributes associated with 
the subject, object, requested operations, and, in some cases, environment conditions against 
policy, rules, or relationships that describe the allowable operations for a given set of attributes 
[103]. ABAC in general is a logical control model that is distinguishable because it controls 
access to objects by evaluating rules against the attributes of entities (subject and object), 
operations, and the environment relevant to a request [41].ABAC enables definite access control, 
which allows for a higher number of discrete inputs into an access control decision, providing a 
bigger set of possible combinations of those variables to reflect a larger and more definitive set 
of possible rules to express policies. 
In [50], the authors note that the access control policies enabled that can be applied in ABAC are 
restricted only by the computational language and the abundant available attributes. Therefore, 
this adaptability allows for the highest range of subjects to access the highest range of objects 
without specifying individual relationships between each subject and each object. For example, 
in a healthcare environment, a subject can be assigned a set of subject attributes when employed 
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(e.g., Alice Doe is a Nurse Practitioner in the Cardiology Department). Also, an object can be 
assigned its object attributes when created (e.g., a folder with Medical Records of Heart 
Patients). Furthermore, objects may be given their attributes either directly from the creator or as 
a result of automated scanning tools.  The administrator or owner of an object creates an access 
control rule using attributes of subjects and objects to manage the set of permissible abilities 
(e.g., all Nurse Practitioners in the Cardiology Department can View the Medical Records of 
Heart Patients). As a result, under ABAC, access decisions can change between requests by 
simply changing attribute values, without having to change the subject/object relationships 
defining basic rule sets. Consequently, this makes up for the provision of a more dynamic access 
control management capability and control the need for long-term maintenance requirements of 
object protections. Therefore, in dynamically changing environments like mobile web services, 
ABAC becomes an ideal access control model to deploy. 
2.5 Discussion 
Advances in specifying analyses have been growing ever since Denning and Denning’s [35] 
early work on static certification of secure information flow. Others like Sabelfeld and Myers [9] 
provide extensive surveys of the literature on language-based information flow control. Majority 
of the works are proposed in the style of a security type system that is shown to enforce the 
prevailing basic semantic notion of secure information flow, noninterference. Despite the 
advances, security type systems have not seen much usage popularity because noninterference is 
difficult to accomplish in practice for a number of reasons not limited to declassification and 
covert channels. Therefore, other ways to introduce flexibility is the consideration of security 
type systems for information flow that takes access control into account. Protection models 
which integrate access control and information flow control in the same framework have not 
been thoroughly explored. The use of CAC models to secure information flow in service 
compositions can be beneficial in achieving the underlying principle of confidentiality and/or 
integrity. In light of the above, our work will focus on enforcing secure information flow control 
during service compositions. We will consider how to prevent illegal flows of information 
between participating services by specifying an access control model that combines location and 
context dependencies for authentication and authorization first. Location dependencies involve 
the location information of the subject trying to access the object specified. RBAC on the other 
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hand is a popular approach to enforcing access control in enterprises and so it follows that one 
might extend this model to handle service compositions. The second step will be to use the 
concept of dependence graphs to enforce information flow control in cases of service 
compositions involving services from potentially different domains with possibly different 
access control policies. Works by Hammer [28], [29] and others [10], [46], [43], [44] will be 
good references for this work or thesis. The goal of this concept (dependence graphs) will be 
monitoring requests for access to data and making decisions as to how to adjust the security 
policy to cope with the observed change without violating the minimum security requirements of 



















The Threat Model 
 
As earlier stated in Chapter 1, a composite service is made up of different services with different 
security policies and most particular from different security domains. These services are in their 
own accord susceptible to specific threats and vulnerabilities from their specific domains. 
However, once the services compose the threats make a common factor to the composite service. 
These can be threats related to access control in one domain and threats related to information 
flow control in another domain. Therefore these threats can impact the access control mechanism 
of the service and also the way the information is propagated once access has been granted. This 
can pose a major security risk of the mobile composed service. The following section presents a 
model of identifying and circumventing these threats when mobile web services compose taking 
into account constraints like location and context dependencies in their authentication for secure 
information flow.  
3.1 Threat model  
This chapter structures the threat modeling process for this work by using the laid down threat 
modeling principles presented by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [74]. It 
details the identification and evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities of the prototype defined in 
Chapter 4 of the mobile web service application. Since there are two security techniques (access 
control and IFC) integrated by the prototype, the threat model covered here seeks to primarily 
address these two techniques’ threats and vulnerabilities by looking closer at the authentication, 
authorization and integrity mechanisms used by the model in a mobile web service environment. 
Therefore, we scale down our model to address the above mentioned security properties. 
We assume a common threat model with a highly motivated adversary who can compromise our 
system by using shoulder surfing on a legitimate user trying to access the system. We scale down 
this model to reflect the contingency factors in our application scenario. In our deployment 
scenario, the attacker shoulder surfs a user’s session, the goal being to steal the user’s login 
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credentials in order to attack the system and steal or gain access to the medical records stored in 
the EMR database. Figure 3.1 illustrates the attack tree which is derived from a list of 
stakeholders, deployment architecture, and communication protocols.  
Stakeholders: we observe that patients are the main stakeholders in this system. Their interest is 
to maintain individual privacy and also the privacy of their medical data. The second group is 
made up of health care providers or nurses, whose interest is system availability, ease of use, and 
maintaining the privacy of patients’ medical data. The third group is made up of physicians or 
doctors, whose interest covers the two groups’ interest as well as managing the system. On a 
high and internal level we also consider a fourth group which is made up of the participating 
services, whose interest is accessing other services’ output to form the composite service. 
Figure 3.1: an attack tree illustrating a threat in which an attacker steals a user’s personal information 
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To put our threat model into perspective, we use a case of a patient trying to access the system 
from a low security domain using his/her mobile device. We assume or consider that a low 
security domain is a public network like an unsecured Wi-Fi hotspot or a cellular network. 
Furthermore, we assume the patient’s location to be a public clinic. In this case we have an 
adversary looking on the patient’s shoulder (shoulder surfing) or a social engineering attack 
whereby the adversary is pre-interacting with the patient to gather intelligence (user information) 
trying to steal the patient’s login credentials to use and get access or steal the patients’ medical 
records. In a public domain and location the system is highly vulnerable to both logical and 
physical attacks. While at a high security or private domain and location, the system enjoys 
improved logical and physical security. Because of the varying degrees of hostility in our 
deployment environments and attack advantages, we assume a sound design which takes into 
account individual components of the system to help identify the threats related to that 
component. Therefore, in subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 we give some assumptions for our threat 
model to hold in the deployment scenario. 
 
3.1.1 Public or low level security threats 
In the public or low level security domain, the system or service application is more vulnerable 
to different kinds of attacks because there is nothing that regulates its usage as a first line of 
defense. The attacker can deploy robust computational resources since the network is 
unrestricted. Below are some assumptions we make regarding threats from unrestricted or public 
networks/domains and locations. 
 It is easy for an attacker to perform shoulder surfing 
 It is easy and cheap for an attacker to deploy automated tools to sniff packets from 
mobile devices 
 We assume that the adversary has a high probability of monitoring all communications 
from network initialization to shutdown given the small number of mobile devices 
involved in that location and the predictability of network operation. 
 We also assume that the adversary can mount active attacks at any time during the 
operation of the network. 
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3.1.2 Private or secure level domain threats 
Patients or users in a high level security domain face a slightly different challenge. Their location 
presents new threats as well as defense opportunities. 
 In a highly secured domain, the adversary has limited computational resources unlike in 
the public or low level security domain because the domain presents a first line of 
defense as it is secured assuming the attacker is not an insider who has full access to 
computational resources. 
 We also assume that the user is susceptible to shoulder surfing like in the low level 
security domain 
 Because of restricted network availability, the attacker has a very low probability of 
monitoring the network during initialization, but he still has opportunities of monitoring 
as well as injecting new traffic in the network during operation. 
 
3.2 Capturing threats and threat model discussion 
From a list of stakeholders and system configuration, we present our threat model in the form of 
an attack tree (Figure 3.1) as described in Section 3.1 above. We seek to uncover how our 
prototype defined in Chapter 3 handles the access control and IFC requirements exploited by the 
threats identified in this section. The threat model information, external dependencies, entry 
points, exit points, trust boundaries, threats and vulnerabilities affecting our prototype are all 
captured in their individual summarized format using the framework presented by [74]. The 
threat modeling presented here is a software centric model which focuses on identifying and 
addressing vulnerabilities by looking for types of attacks against each element of the model. All 
the perceived threats that (may) affect the prototype and their mitigations are covered in the 
sections that follow.  
3.2.1 Threat Model Information 
This section presents the information relating to the service application. Such information 
includes the service application version, application or document owner, service application 
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description and participants. Although this information may not be relevant to the attacker, we 
present this information for documentation and presentation purposes. 




Description: The Electronic Health Record Medical (EMR) service application will be able 
to provide clients with on the go medical records on their mobile devices. 
This is the first implementation of the service application; therefore, 




Patients will be able to log in and view their medical records; nurses can view 
and add users and users’ medical records to the system or database. Physicians 
will be able to log in, edit users’ medical records, and add users as well as 
manage the service application. 
Doc. Owner: Lwazi Maziya 
 
3.2.2 External Dependencies  
These are items external to the code of the application that may pose a threat to the application. 
They may also be used by an adversary as third party points of attack to the service application. 
                                                       External Dependencies 
ID Description 
1 The Electronic Medical Record application will run on a Windows server running Apache. 
This server will be hardened (security enhanced) as per the provider's server hardening 
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standard. This will include deploying the application of the latest operating system and 
application security patches. 
2 The database server will be MySQL and it will run on a Windows server. This server will 
be hardened as per the provider's server hardening standard. This will include the 
application of the latest operating system and application security patches. 




3.2.3 Entry Points 
Entry points outline the interfaces through which potential adversaries or attackers can interact 
with the application or even supply it with data. They are therefore basically entry points for 
attack of the service application. Entry points can include the front-end of the service application 
like communication ports or internal entry points (which are points that support internal 
communication with other components of the application) exposed by subcomponents of the 
application across its layers. Therefore, it is important to know where these entry points are and 
what type of input data they receive should an attacker plots an attack by evading the front end of 
the application and directly interacts or attacks these internal entry points. The table below 
covers the EMR service application entry points. 
 
Entry Points 
ID Name     Description Trust Levels 
1 HTTPS Port The service app will only be accessible via 
TLS. All pages within the service app are 
layered on this entry point. 
(1) Anonymous Mobile 
Web User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
(2) Anonymous Mobile 
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Web User with Invalid 
Login Credentials 
(3) User with Valid 
Login Credentials 




1.1 EMR Main 
Page 
The splash page for the medical health records 
application is the entry point for all users. 
(1) Anonymous Mobile 
Web User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
(2) Anonymous Web 
User with Invalid Login 
Credentials 
(3) User with Valid 
Login Credentials 




1.2 Login Page Patients, nurses and physicians must log in to 
the service app before they can carry out any 
of the use cases. 
(1) Anonymous Mobile 
Web User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
(2) Anonymous Web 
User with Invalid Login 
Credentials 
(3) User with Valid 
Login Credentials 






The login function accepts user supplied 
credentials and compares them with those in 
(3) User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
(4) User with Invalid 
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the database. Login Credentials 
(5) System
Administrator
1.3 Search Entry 
Page 





These are boundaries that indicate where trust levels change. They help focus analysis on areas 
of concern. They generally represent the access rights that the service application will award 
external entities. They are cross referenced with the entry points and assets. This allows defining 
the access rights or privileges required at each entry point, and those required to interact with 
each asset. They are documented with a unique ID, descriptive Name and a description of the 
trust level detailing the external entity who has been granted the trust level. 
Trust Levels 
ID Name Description 
1 Anonymous Mobile 
Web User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
A user who has connected to the EMR service app and has 
provided valid credentials. 
2 Anonymous Mobile 
Web User with 
Invalid Login 
Credentials 
A user who has connected to the EMR service app but has not 
provided valid credentials 
3 User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
A user who has connected to the EMR service app and has 
logged in using valid login credentials. 
4 User with Invalid 
Login Credentials 
A user who has connected to the EMR service app and is 
attempting to log in using invalid login credentials. 
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5 System Admin The system admin can create users on the EMR service app and 
view their personal information. 
 
6 Database Server 
Administrator 
The database server administrator has read and writes access to 




The Website administrator can configure the EMR service app.  
8 Mobile Web Server 
User Process 
This is the process per user that the web server executes code as 
and uses to authenticate itself against the database server as. 
 
9 Database Read User The database the user uses to access the database for read access.  
10 Database Read/Write 
User 





These are the areas of interest to the adversary or attacker. They are essentially threat targets. 
They can be both physical and abstract. Physical assets are items that can be found or entered 
into the system or database. For example, a physical asset of this application might be a list of 
patients and their personal information. An abstract asset is an asset that cannot be entered or 
found on the system but relates to the system. This might be the reputation of a hospital/clinic. 
Assets are documented in the threat model as follows: A unique ID is assigned to identify each 
asset for easy cross reference to threats and vulnerabilities identified, a descriptive Name that 
clearly identifies the asset, a textual description of what the asset is and why it needs to be 
protected and Trust levels, which are level of access required to access the entry point. 
 
                                                                     Assets 
ID Name                               Description Trust Levels 




1.1 User Login 
Details 
The login credentials that a patient, nurse or 
physician will use to log into the EMR service 
app. 
(3) User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
(5) System Admin 
(6) Database Server 
Administrator  
(8) Web Server 
User Process 







The login credentials that a Physician will use to 
log into the EMR service app. 
(5) System Admin 
(6) Database Server 
Administrator  
(8) Web Server 
User Process 




1.3 Personal Data This is data that entails the patients, nurses or 
health practitioner, and physicians’ name, last 
name, username, password, medical history, 
disease, diagnosis, treatment. 
(5) System Admin 




(8) Web Server 
User Process 






2 System Assets relating to the underlying system.  
2.1 Availability of 
EMR service app 
The EMR service app should be available 24 
hours a day and can be accessed by all users. 




2.2 Ability to 
Execute Code as 
a Web Server 
User 
This is the ability to execute source code on the 
web server as a web server user. 
(7) Website 
Administrator  
(8) Web Server 
User Process  
2.3 Ability to 
Execute SQL as 
a Database Read 
User 
This is the ability to execute SQL select queries 
on the database, and thus retrieve any information 
stored within the EMR database. 
(6) Database Server 
Administrator 




2.4 Ability to 
Execute SQL as 
a Database 
Read/Write User 
This is the ability to execute SQL. Select, insert, 
and update queries on the database and thus have 
read and write access to any information stored 
within the EMR database. 




3 Website Assets relating to the EMR service app.  
3.1 Login Session This is the login session of a user to the EMR 
service app. This user could be a patient, a nurse 
or physician or a system admin. 
(3) User with Valid 
Login Credentials 
(5) System Admin 
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3.2 Access to the 
Database Server 
Access to the database server allows you to 
administer the database, giving you full access to 
the database users and all data contained within 
the database. 
(6) Database Server 
Administrator 
3.3 Ability to Create 
Users 
The ability to create users would allow an 
individual to create new users on the system. 
These are nurses and physicians. 
(5) System Admin 
(7) Website 
Administrator 
3.4 Access to Audit 
Data 
The audit data shows all audit-able events that 
occurred within the EMR application by patients, 





3.3 Service Application Security Mechanisms 
The following are the most prevalent known service application security mechanisms identified 
so far; 
 Forms are used for user’s authentication. 
 Windows authentication is used to authenticate application at the database. 
 Roles are used to authenticate access to system logic – the governing behavior of the 
system. 
 Remote access is not defined or given for administration; it is only defined for mobile 
web users. Only physical logging on to server computer can allow administration. 
3.4 Threats  
Apart from the threat assumptions made in subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the service application 
could be subjected to the following threats; 
 Susceptible to brute force attack against the dictionary store to obtain login credentials 
 Susceptible to social engineering thus an adversary can steal user credentials 
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 An adversary obtains encryption keys used to encrypt private and sensitive data 
(tampering) 
 An adversary gets unauthorized access to server resources by a mobile device 
(information disclosure) 
 SQL injection occurs, enabling an attacker to exploit an input validation vulnerability 
thus taking control of the database (elevation of privilege) 
 Client credentials are captured through network eavesdropping between browser and 
mobile web server (man in the middle) 
 An adversary or user gets authenticated and authorized in the wrong context whereby a 
patient gets physician rights and privileges after authentication.  
 An adversary manages to take control of web server thus enabling him unauthorized 
control of the database (elevation of privilege) 
 A service in a lower security domain receives or can read sensitive data from a higher 
security domain (information disclosure) 
The determination or identification of the above threats can be summarized by using the STRIDE 
[49] categorization technique as shown in Table below: 
STRIDE Threat List 
Type Threat action Security 
Control 
 
Spoofing Threat action aimed at illegally accessing and using another 
user's credentials, such as username and password. 
Authentication  
Tampering Threat action aimed to maliciously change/modify 
persistent data, such as persistent data in a database, and the 
alteration of data in transit between two computers over an 
open network, such as the Internet. 
Integrity  
Repudiation Threat action aimed to perform illegal operations in a 







Threat action to read a file that one was not granted access 






Threat aimed to deny access to valid users, such as by 




Threat aimed to gain privileged access to resources for 
gaining unauthorized access to information or to 
compromise a system. 
Authorization  
 
3.5 Vulnerabilities  
These are un-mitigated threats or threats identified with no countermeasures. The service 
application vulnerabilities therefore are; 
 Storage of user passwords – when passwords are stored as clear text with no encryption 
they become easily visible to attackers. 
 Lack of password complexity enforcement – when there is no enforcement of password 
creation; dictionary attacks easily retrieve sensitive data. 
 Weak input validation on server side – when server does not validate the data stored or 
queried; all executed code is accepted making the system vulnerable to malicious code. 
 Covert channels – when all known channels are not secured 
 Failure to sanitize data read from a database makes data to be easily interpreted when 
intercepted thus disclosing sensitive information without problems. 
 
3.6 Countermeasures  
The major purpose of a countermeasure (a safeguard that addresses a threat and mitigates risk) 
identification is to try and regulate if there are some protective measures that can be adopted to 
prevent the threats identified from being realized. Since these threats have been categorized with 
STRIDE, it is therefore possible to find the right countermeasures to address them from the 
service application. The countermeasures adopted for the threats identified for this work are 
given in a summary below. 
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Threat Type Mitigation Techniques Countermeasure 
Spoofing Identity 1. Appropriate authentication
2. Protect secret data
3. Don't store secrets in the
clear
 Authentication tokens and
credentials are protected
and stored in encrypted
format
 Passwords are stored with
salted hashes










4. Tamper resistant protocols
 Attribute and role based
access control is used to
restrict access to selected
operations
 Role based access control,
location and context are
used to authorize access to
resources
 No authorization tokens
and credentials sent in
clear text
 IFC compliant policies are
used to protect data
integrity





Repudiation 1. Digital signatures 
2. Timestamps 
3. Audit trails 
 Only verified and signed 
attribute certificates by 
security authorities can be 





3. Protect secrets 
4. Don't store secrets in the 
clear 
 Program Dependence 
Graph (PDG) compliant 
policies are used for 
information flow 
 Minimum set requirement 
satisfaction of context and 
location is used to grant 
access to resources and 
allow information flow 
 Only Attribute certificates 
authorized can disclose 
information 
 Encrypted data in storage 
Elevation of 
privilege 
1. Run with least privilege  
 
Note: this work’s focus is on addressing threats relating to the CIA-triad. Although the other 
security properties are listed or covered on the STRIDE categorization with their 
countermeasures, however, they are not the primary focus of this work. 
3.7 Discussion 
In this chapter we outlined the threat model that can be employed by an adversary to attack our 
model. We derived and summarized the threats and vulnerabilities by making use of the system 
application’s key components that could be targeted by an attacker. These include the entry 
points, assets, external dependencies, etc. Moreover, we identified the type of attacks that can be 
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used by an attacker to compromise the system or attacks that the system can be prone to. These 
attacks include shoulder surfing, brute force attack, dictionary attack, eavesdropping or spoofing 
and SQL injection. Consequently, we also specify methods that can be used to circumvent or 
prevent the above mentioned attacks from taking place or deployed. These circumvention 
methods or countermeasures include but are not limited to using appropriate authentication and 
authorization techniques like protecting tokens and credentials and storing them in encrypted 
formats, storing passwords with salted hashes, not sending tokens and credentials in clear text, 
employing IFC compliant policies which enforce approved authorizations for controlling the 
flow of information within the system to protect data integrity and meeting the minimum set 














System and Security Model 
The threat model presented in Chapter 3 details the threats and vulnerabilities that can impact our 
access and information flow control mechanisms in the system. In order to circumvent these 
threats, we need a comprehensive model or prototype that will act against the threats and 
vulnerabilities presented in Section 3.2. In this chapter we present both the access and 
information flow control security mechanisms used to make our model secure from the identified 
threats. We detail the access control scheme used and the way(s) we employ to achieve secure 
flow of information when mobile web services compose in resource constrained environments 
taking into consideration location and context dependencies in both authentication and 
authorization. Furthermore, we present the system and security model adoption guidelines as 
described in section 4.1 below.  
4.1 Design Overview 
This chapter details the systematic process that was followed in order to form the guiding 
principles for designing the model that we used for implementing the system for this work. We 
explain the research design objectives and the methodology we used to achieve the design 
objectives. Therefore, we focus on three principles: the research design chosen, methodology and 
model/prototype design and specification. 
This research study adopts an experimental approach [99]. According to Vessey et al. [99], 
experimental research relies on systematic manipulation and testing to measure changes in 
variables. As indicated in Chapter 2, various works related to this thesis have produced different 
models and designs to address the different Information Flow Control issues. Thus, on the basis 
of these secure information flow issues, this research seeks to identify a solution to a central 
problem of how to specify a security policy in dynamically changing security domains to ensure 
secure information flow without violating minimum security requirements for all the 
participating services. Hence, this research design was appropriate for this work as it is important 
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to test variables such as the authentication/authorization and integrity of mobile service 
compositions when they occur, so as to come up with a security policy on how to prevent illegal 
flows of information.  
The research design involved mapping and narrowing this thesis to address two constraints that 
can impact security in mobile web services namely: location and context with respect to secure 
information flow. The main idea here was to come up with new results on addressing the 
constraints mobile web services have in security policies during service compositions and what 
difference mobile web services make. Therefore, these constraints (location and context) will be 
evaluated on how they are addressed, that is, how they impact the specified access control 
scheme and information flow control. 
 
4.2 Prototype Design 
Drawing considerations from previous related work, we derive our prototype based on the 
prototype defined by She et al. [103] of a web service system; Figure 4.1 depicts the elements of 
a mobile web service system which consists of a security domain where data resources, services, 
security authorities and service composers are found. Each service composer generates services 
to form a composite service and each service has access to data resources. Also, each service is 
monitored by a security authority of that particular security domain for compliance with the 





                                                      Figure 4.1: Mobile Web Service System 
Definition 1: A mobile web service system includes a set of domains {d1, d2,…}, a set of 
locations {l1, l2…} and a set of service composers {qcomp1, qcomp2,…}. Each domain di is a tuple 
<di.S, di.R, di.sa>, where di.S = {di.si, di.s2…} is the set of all services in di, di.R = {di.s1, 
di.s2,…} is the set of all data resources in di and di.sa is the security authority (SA) of di. di.sa 
manages a set of access control policies di.Pol = {di.pol1, di.pol2,…} to control the access to di.R. 
Data resources refer to the data/information itself and any object that may store or receive 
data/information. Such an object can be a data container, such as a file, directory, a relation, a 
view, etc. also, we assume that all services are honest-but-curious, that is, they follow the 
protocol and conform to the access control policies defined, however, these services may attempt 
to derive sensitive information of others from the information they have received or trying to 
access. They may derive such information by (cheating, sharing their private information) 
gaining information about other services’ private input sets, other than what can be deduced from 
the result of the protocol. 
4.2.1 Location 
The revolution in the field of hand held (mobile) devices has been upward in the last couple of 
years. And this has been made possible by improvements in processor speeds, screen size, 
graphic quality and more importantly due to the advancement and emergence of new 
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technologies that make transfer between a server and a mobile device faster. Furthermore, 
mobile devices’ (mobile phones in particular) user base is rapidly surpassing the use of personal 
computers (PCs), notebooks and laptops in developing countries or rural areas. Hence, the need 
for mobile web services development is playing a significant role in providing services in 
remote/rural areas where without such mobile service developments; it would be difficult for 
people to have access to these services. Given, that mobile web services offer solutions to where 
traditional web services can’t tap into, mobile web services face the biggest challenge of speed 
and connectivity which is very limited and which their traditional counterparts enjoy in wired 
connections. Therefore, it is imperative to consider that their deployment is largely dependent on 
the wireless/cellular network coverage provided by the service provider. 
However, in this work our emphasis and focus is on the impact location has in regards to changes 
in security domain with heavy reliance on the access control model we define. We look at or try 
and resolve the challenges faced by service compositions when the security domain changes and 
how this affects information flow control. In the mobile environment just like in smart spaces or 
cloud computing, changes in security domains are both unavoidable and autonomous. This is 
because in mobile web services the relationship between users and resources is dynamic and 
more ad-hoc. Users and resource providers are generally not located in the same security domain.  
Therefore, there is a need for a flexible or dynamic access control model to handle such changes 
with relevant ease without putting a strain or compromise on both their performance and 
security. We define location as the physical position at a given time when a security domain 
changes. Therefore each service is bound to a particular location at each security domain during 
composition given by definition 2 below; 
Definition 2: li.ci.S = {s1.li.ci, s2.li.ci,…}.di  is the set of all services in li.ci. and li.ci is in dom di, 
where li.ci is the location of service i under context i. 
As a result, merging definition 1 and 2, we define a mobile web service as follows; 
Definition 3: A mobile web service system includes a set of domains {d1, d2,…}, a set of 
locations {l1, l2…} and a set of service composers {qcomp1, qcomp2,…}. Each domain di is a tuple 
<di.S, di.R, di.sa, li.ci>, where di.S = {di.si, di.s2…} is the set of all services in di, di.R = {di.s1, 
di.s2,…} is the set of all data resources in di, di.sa is the security authority (SA) of di. The security
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authority, di.sa manages a set of access control policies di.Pol = {di.pol1, di.pol2,…} to control the 
access to di.R and li.ci is the set of locations for S in di under context ci. 
 In general, a composite location can be defined using a workflow, which is a composition of 
component locations. As each service is bound to a particular location, it suffices that in an 
abstract workflow; each component location is abstract and is to be grounded to a concrete 
location. And in a concrete workflow, each component location composes the mobile web 
service. This is because from definition 2 above, each service is not complete without being 
bound to a specific location. Fig.4.2 illustrates how location impacts or influences the 
composition of services in different security domains. Note that in security domain C the service 
has two locations, location 3 and 4, clinic and home respectively. Therefore, the service can be 
bound to either one of the locations; however, the access control policies enforced towards the 
same service will differ even though both locations are in the same security domain. As a result, 
location is an important constraint that needs addressing when employing a fine-grained access 
control model in dynamic environments when security policies change autonomously. 
 
                                                                  Figure 4.2: services depiction bounded by location 
Hence, we define a role-based access control model to handle these changes in both roles and 
location. Roles are assigned dynamically based on the participating service’s or user’s trust level 
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and they help manage access to the resources. The role separation allows simplifying policies 
and makes them easy to adapt or configure.  
The Role Based Access Control model to handle these dynamic changes is covered in Section 
4.4. The trust level calculation is based on the participant service or user’s context, which 
includes identification attributes, location, device type, etc. Moreover, access control rules are 
used to calculate the trust level, assign roles based on the trust level and to grant permissions to 
requested services/resources. Section 4.4 covers Role Based Access Control in detail. 
For experimental purposes in Chapter 5, we look at how a change from a high level security 
domain (e.g. a secured network connection) to a low level security domain (open network) 
impacts the access control model and its information flow control. We observe what exactly 
happens during the change in security domain at a particular location; we look at if the user is 




The uses of context-aware services improve the way users browse information on constrained 
devices like mobile devices. Services which are context-aware pro-actively select information 
using context variables that are gathered from the device’s environment. Additionally, the 
context of a user (i.e. location, time, system resources, network state, user’s activity, battery 
power level, etc.) in mobile web services is highly dynamic, and granting a user access without 
taking the user’s current context into account can compromise security as the user’s access 
privileges not only depend on “who the user is” but also on “where the user is” and “what the 
user’s state is and that of the user’s environment”. 
We address the constraint issue of context by addressing how it impacts the secure flow of 
information and how the access control model defined handles accesses to resources based on 
surrounding circumstances. As earlier defined in Subsection 4.2.1, in our case context relates to 
the user’s ID, device type, role, and environment. We examine security levels, how public 
information can be published or made available and processed by all participating services, 
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however, and the private information provided remains only for authorized/appropriate 
participants when corresponding access permissions are granted. Therefore, the user’s identity 
(ID), role is taken into account when requesting a service/information at the given security level. 
For instance, at a given change in security domain, is the service requester cleared to have access 
to private/sensitive information or authentication is needed first for such to take place based on 
the user’s current context.  
Therefore, in our work, context impacts heavily on secure information flow because when the 
security domain changes in a particular location during composition, attributes of who the user is 
or what the user’s state is must be addressed in order to allow the dissemination of information to 
occur. Table 4.1 gives a summary of the access control policies with the location and context 
dependencies. Hence, if the user or service’s context defined in that particular domain is not 
satisfied during the composition, even though the location may meet all requirements, 
information will not flow. Also, note that even though the right context may be defined in the 
correct security domain but at a wrong location, access or the flow of information will not be 
granted. Likewise, giving the right context and location but wrong domain will result in denied 
access or no flow of information. 
Table 4.1: access and information flow control conditions and outcomes with location and 
context dependencies 
User Role User Location User Context Security Domain Access/info flow 
1       Grant 
2     X Deny 
3   X   Deny 
4   X X Deny 
5      X     Deny 
6      X      X   Deny 
7      X      X X Deny 
 




4.3 Service and Service Chain 
We model the flow of information in service chains using an abstract dataflow model [103]. In 
this model, each service y (bound to a location l and satisfying context c) takes the input data y.In 
from the end user or another service x, and finishes its own calculations, and produces its output 
y.Out, which is sent to another service or the end user z. The computation of y may use some data 
resources stored in dom(y), i.e., y.R. As we only consider the deterministic system, the set of 
output data of y, y.Out, can be expressed as a function of its input, y.In, and local data resources, 
y.R.  
Since a composite service is a composition of component services, it can therefore be defined 
with a workflow. We consider abstract and concrete workflows. An abstract workflow is one 
which has information about all the services needed to compose the required composite service 
and a concrete workflow is one that has specific services for the required service to compose. In 
an abstract workflow, each component service is abstract and is to be grounded to a concrete 
service. In a concrete workflow, each component service is a concrete mobile web service. On 
composition, the service composer is given the desired abstract workflow and denotes each 
instance of an abstract component service by a concrete service. Our work only considers a 
simplified workflow, a service chain. We define an abstract and concrete service chain as 
follows: 
Definition 4: An abstract service chain <s0, as1.l1.c1, . . . , asn.ln.cn, sn+1> consists of two end 
users, s0 and sn+1, where s0 is the user who sends the input data to as1 and sn+1 is the user who 
receives the output data from asn, and a sequence of abstract services, as1.l1.c1, . . . , , asn.ln.cn, 
that should be grounded to concrete services. A concrete service chain <s0, s1.l1.c1,. . . sn.ln.cn, 
sn+1> consists of the two end users, s0 and sn+1, and a sequence of concrete services s1.l1.c1, . . . 
,sn. ln.cn where s1 is bound to location l1 under context c1. 
We consider that each abstract or concrete service is bound by a component abstract or concrete 
location as earlier defined. A concrete location is one that has a specific location and an abstract 
location is one that can take on one of all the possible locations at a specific time but where the 
exact location is not known at runtime. This means that for instance in a concrete service chain, 
the two end users, s0 and sn+1 are in fact s0.l0 and sn+1.ln+1 respectively. We also consider that 
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when a user submits an abstract service chain to a service composer, the service composer 
returns a concrete service chain with the two end users s0 and sn+1 included in the chain as 
services. They may be the same user or may be different. Therefore, to guarantee that the correct 
user is making a service request, we need to make sure that each user is defined as a correct user. 
Section 4.4 below defines how the users are given roles to use when making service requests. 
4.4 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
In general web services’ access control is implemented using two main security practices; 
authentication and authorization. Authentication basically defines how to establish identity and 
authorization permits or denies that identity to access resources. Therefore, to achieve this in our 
mobile web service prototype, we are going to make use of a RBAC model, with an extension to 
an attribute-role based access control. 
As established by [81], the fundamental concept of RBAC is to introduce a “Role” between users 
and permissions. An administrator defines various roles according to demands and sets the 
access authority according to the role while users are assigned to different roles according to 
their responsibility. In this way, the access authority can be assigned to a certain role and users 
can get the access authority owned by roles through playing various roles. Fig.4.3 below 
illustrates the basic relation among user, role and authority/permission in a RBAC model and 
Fig.4.5 illustrates the basic logical implementation architecture of a RBAC model. We define a 
role as follows; 
Definition 5: Each service or data resource x is associated with a set of roles Role(x) = {rol1(x), 
rol2(x),…}. Each role rol(x) ϵ Role(x) is defined as a tuple (rol(x).name, rol(x).location) in which 
rol(x).name is a string that uniquely specifies the name of the role, and rol(x).location is a string 
that uniquely specifies the location of the role. 
Each service owns a set of attributes and these are the roles, location, context, etc. In order for a 
service requestor to be granted access to resources or data, the service’s location and context are 
taken into account bound by the role granted to that particular requestor.  
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Figure 4.3: The Basic RBAC Model: Relationship between users, roles, permission and session. 
This access control model is a base for our work taking into consideration the constraint 
attributes (location and context) being addressed. The concept of role hierarchy is an important 
component in addressing location aware access control in particular since different users are 
assigned roles in different security domains, location and context. See example Figure 4.4 below 
which demonstrates role and location changes. 
Figure 4.4: Role change depiction of a user under different security domains and location 
Figure 4.4 above illustrates a role change of the same user when security domain and location 
changes. The same user is assigned different roles in different locations when there’s a change in 
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security domain. This also holds true for the same user in the same security domain but different 
locations. However, a super user for instance a system administrator can have the same role 
across the board irrespective of what domain and/or location he/she is at. An example role 
hierarchy in a healthcare environment is a case whereby a health care provider’s role is inherited 
by a physician and the physician’s role in turn inherited by a specialist physician or a primary 
care physician. Therefore, the specialist physician in this regard can be considered a super user 
of the system, thus inheriting all the roles and privileges/permissions given to all users. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: The logical implementation of access control 
To illustrate the logical implementation of our access control (RBAC) in relation to Figure 4.5 
above, we use an Apache Axis framework to publish the Mobile Web Services [98]. This 
framework is based on Java Web Technology (Servlet). An Axis Handler is used to perform 
authentication and authorization control. The data which is service definition, user definition and 
permission definition is stored in a MySQL database. We integrate with open standards to use 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [87] encoding for representing user 
authentication, user-role assignment, and permission-role assignment. As an example, take a 
physician user, we describe the working process as follows. 
1. User (a physician) logging on portal; 
2. Portal capturing user’s authentication and authorization credentials; 
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3. Portal creating and signing SAML assertion, and placing SAML in a Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) message; 
4. Portal sending SOAP message to Mobile Web Services; 
5. Mobile Web Services Handler accepting or denying request to Mobile Web Services 
based on original user’s role (RBAC); 
6. Mobile Web Services Handler finally sending message to Mobile Web Services; 
7. Mobile Web Services processing; 
8. Mobile Web Services sending response back to portal. 
Drawing similarities from the She et.al [102, 103] access control model, an attribute-based 
access control model is considered for this work as an extension of the RBAC model to help in 
handling dynamic access to resources. The model we now define combines both attributes and 
roles. Each service or data resource is complemented by a set of attributes defined. These 
attributes may comprise service name, the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) pointer, 
the permission granted to the service, role, reputation, etc.  
Each data resource’s attribute may contain owner, security level, etc. Attributes of a resource are 
incorporated in the metadata and held in reserve with the data. All service attributes must be 
affirmed by a security authority (SA) and included in a certificate, called the attribute certificate. 
An issuer of an attribute certificate must sign each and every attribute certificate the issuer hands 
out.  
As a rule of thumb, we consider that in each security domain, a SA manages the attribute 
certificates of all the services in that particular domain. Furthermore, attributes of a service can 
be sensitive (secret) or non-sensitive (public). Public attributes can be shared or exchanged freely 
among participating services without meeting specified access rules. However, secret attributes 
needs to be negotiated i.e. authorized participants have to be evaluated to meet the access control 
policies in place before allowed access to attribute certificate. 
The basic concept of attribute-based access control represents a logical access control model 
which controls access to objects by evaluating rules against attributes of the entities (subject and 
object) actions and the environment relevant to a request. Also, an access control policy is a set 
of conditions defined over the set of all attributes used by the domain (the set of all attributes 
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defined for services and resources in the domain). To simplify our model, we consider a unified 
set of attributes defined across all domains. Therefore, when a service A accesses a data resource 
b, A presents its attribute certificate, which contains a set of attributes to domain b. Domain b’s 
SA verifies A’s attribute certificate from its issuer. A’s attributes are evaluated against the access 
control policies of service B. If they correspond, access is granted else access is denied. 
4.5 Addressing Information Flow Control 
Information flow control is a critical aspect of this work and is addressed first by ensuring that 
the access control requirements of the service are met by all participating services. This is to 
guarantee not only that direct access to resources is considered but also for indirectly interacting 
services. For example, considering a service chain <A, B, C>. Assume that B’s output is 
computed from some of its own sensitive information and some sensitive data received from A. 
When B’s output is sent to C, C may use the received data to derive the sensitive information of 
A, resulting in an information flow from A to C (a running example to illustrate this concept is 
given in section 4.5.1). Therefore such information flows, if not handled carefully, may result in 
undesired information leakage. Relevantly, in our case a service with a high security level in a 
high security domain leaking sensitive information when the security domain changes (secured 
connection to unsecured/open connection) from a high to a low security domain. Henceforth, our 
scheme (use of Program Dependence Graphs (PDGs) and path conditions combined with the 
access control model) will address such challenges when changes in security domains occur. 
This will be enforced by meeting the path conditions like trust levels (is service requester 
permitted to revoke a service given its participating context, roles given and/or permissions 
assigned). 
4.5.1 Dataflow with Program Dependence Graphs (PDGs) 
We use the concept of PDGs to enforce the secure flow of information between services from 
potentially different security domains with possibly different access control policies. We 
consider the motivating example application workflow presented by She at al. [103] (Fig. 4.6) to 
address and demonstrate the need for the IFC in service composition and the benefit of 
considering access control at composition time. 
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The following rules apply for dataflow to take place; 
 Service a has to be authenticated first in order to access resources of another service 
 Information can only flow from one service to another when path conditions are met. 
These conditions include trust levels, authentication verification. 
 Information flow is achievable by using PDGs 
 Additionally, we use the example presented by [28] to help demonstrate the concepts (of PDGs) 
in our model. A workflow is used to help with screening of disease x by first extracting 
association rules from medical data of patients with and without disease x. Association rules are 
then used to determine how likely a new patient does have disease x. The workflow consists of 
the following abstract services; a client program CLN, a medical database MDB, a template 
image database TDB, an image enhancement service IES, an image registration service IRS, an 
object recognition service ORS, an association rule mining service ARM, and a classifier CLS as 
shown in Figure 4.6 below. 
 
                                                                  Figure 4.6: Example workflow 
CLN first searches MDB (with keyword x) for the medical records of the patients who are 
diagnosed to have the disease x, and searches TDB (with keywords such as “bone,” “polyp,” 
“nodule,” and so on) for the template images for object recognition. Each medical record stored 
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in MDB includes the alphanumeric medical data, for example, the patient’s medical history, 
family history, personal data (e.g., gender, age, height, weight, living area, etc.), and the medical 
images (e.g., CT, X-ray, Nuclear, etc.). The alphanumeric medical data of MDB are sent to 
ARM. The template images are sent to ORS. The medical images are first sent to IES, which 
performs image enhancement (e.g., noise cancellation, etc.). The enhanced images are sent to 
IRS, which performs image registration to align different images into one coordinate system. The 
aligned images are sent to ORS, which detects and recognizes the objects in the images (e.g., 
bones, polyps, nodules, etc.) using the template images. 
After recognition, it assigns labels to the recognized objects in the image. The labeled images are 
sent to ARM, which uses these images together with the alphanumeric medical data received 
from MDB to extract association rules that are sent to CLS. 
We now consider the sensitivity of the data that are used by the composite service (Note that this 
abstract composite service includes three abstract service chains). We assume that the search 
keywords that CLN sends to MDB and TDB are sensitive and, hence, require protection and the 
recipients are required to have read permissions to these data. The alphanumeric medical data 
that MDB send to ARM and the medical images that MDB send to IES are also sensitive and the 
recipients are required to have read permissions to these data as well. (Note that the recipient 
rather than the invoker needs to have the proper privilege. For example, IES needs to have read 
permission to the medical images in MDB, but CLN does not.) The template images are used in 
a pay per- use manner and, hence, require the recipients to present proper privilege. 
Next, consider the concrete services that can be used to instantiate the abstract services and the 
privileges they have (Fig. 4.7). For simplicity, we assume that CLN, MDB, TDB, IES, IRS, and 
CLS are already concretized by cln1; mdb1; tdb1; ies1; irs1, and cls1, respectively. From these 
concretized services we can derive a PDG that ensures a secure flow of information between 
these services. Each service is a node control dependent on the node invoking it. Moreover, set 
conditions (like trust levels) are used as path conditions (necessary conditions for information 
flow between nodes/services) between the nodes. For instance, for cln1 to invoke access to mdb1 
(which contains the patient’s details), authentication and authorization conditions have to be met 
before any further computations or interactions can take place. cln1 and cls1 are hosted by 
hospital A (domain A). mdb1 and tdb1 are hosted by hospital B (domain B) and research institute 
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C (domain C), respectively. ies1 and irs1 are hosted by research institute D (domain D). ORS 
can be instantiated by ors1; ors2, and ors3. Note that ies1 can modify the content of the medical 
image received from mdb1, and irs1 can modify the content of the images received from ies1. 
Figure 4.7: Concrete services and their permissions 
Hence, the medical images of mdb1 are essentially delivered to the ORS service (ors1; ors2, or 
ors3) in their modified forms. ARM can be instantiated by arm1 and arm2. We consider that 
ors1 and arm1 are hosted by institute D, ors2 is hosted by research institute E (domain E), and 
ors3 and arm2 are hosted by university F (domain F). 
For simplicity, we assume that all the services can be invoked by anyone and we only define the 
resource-based access control policies here. Consider that service x invokes service y. If y does 
not read/write any sensitive local data (e.g., a table, etc.) in its computation, then the invocation 
can be directly granted. If y reads some sensitive local data resources r, then the invocation is 
granted when x has the read permission to r and its location is concretized with the service and 
deemed to be secure. Similarly, if y writes to r, then the invocation is granted when x has the 
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write permission to r and is at the right location. Fig. 4.7 depicts the resource access permissions. 
Table 4.2 shows a simple access control matrix used for MDB. We assume there are two kinds of 
services, i.e. admin management service and medical records management service. Admin 
management service provides a function of maintaining user table (where all the users login 
credentials are added and stored) and the medical records table (where all the users’ medical data 
is kept), while medical records management service includes services of View_MDB, 
Edit_MDB and Delete_MDB. Three roles including patient, nurse and physician have different 
operation permissions to access user table and medical records table as shown below. We 
consider that institutes D and E are federated with hospital B and, hence, services ies1; irs1; 
ors1; arm1; ors2 have the read permission to the medical data in domain B. Also, we consider 
that institute E has purchased the service of tdb1 from institute C, and hence, ors2 has the read 
permission to the template images in domain C. No other read/write accesses to the medical data 
or the template images are allowed. 
Table: 4.2: Access control matrix employed for the Medical Data Records 












Patient             X            X         X 
Nurse                X    
Physician         
 
4.5.2 IFC Illustration with PDGs in Mobile web services 
Employing the concept of PDGs, we consider a model whereby a mobile web service is an entry 
node in a dataflow model to perfect the flow of data/information between services or composing 
services. Note that subsequent nodes under the entry node are attributes of the entry node in the 
same security domain. However, other services can also be invoked from different security 
domains to form the required composite service solution. These subsequent services are control 
dependent on the entry node if they are invoked to complete the desired solution even though 
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they may originate from a different domain. Hence their participation is dependent on the node 
invoking them (entry node or subsequent node) to form part of the required composite service. 
Therefore they need to be authenticated and authorized in order to participate.  For services to 
allow the flow of information between them, we derive such flows from Program dependence 
graphs defined by [28] as follows; 
Definition 6:  a data/information dependent service A → B means that service A assigns or 
disseminates information used by B (without being released elsewhere underway or without 
being assigned to any other service thereafter) [28].  
Note that although Hammer uses PDGs as standard tools to model information flow through a 
program, we extend this notion to suffice for modeling the flow of information through or 
between web services. Therefore, program statements used to resemble graph nodes will 
resemble services in their initial or invoked states. Also, note that a graph node is mapped to the 
given context of the service. For instance, a node may be comprised of a service in a given 
network state. The change of the network state may mean a change in context for that particular 
node. Thus a control dependence of service A → B means that B’s use of the information 
depends on the context given by A. Take for instance in our running example, ies1 can only 
enhance the image given by mdb1 if the request from mdb1 is for enhancement, say noise 
cancellation. Then that is when ies1 can act on that desired request.  This is done by using path 
conditions, which according to Hammer [28] are necessary conditions for information flow 
between two nodes. Although Hammer uses typical conditions in while or if loops, in our case 
these conditions may include the roles and/or permissions given to each service requesting the 
service from A or any other service. Therefore, since ies1 is dependent on tdb1 for carrying out 
its operations after meeting the set conditions, it then suffices to conclude that there is a path 
from tdb1 to ies1. This relatively means that information can flow through that path. However, 
each service requesting information/data from a service higher in the security level must be 
cleared or authorized to do so without leaking any information that is sensitive or private 
regardless of which security domain it is in, given its context at participation time. 
 Fig.4.8 below illustrates an example of a simple PDG extracted from the concrete services and 
their permissions in Fig 4.7. The figure shows a path from the entry node, cln1 accessing the 




                                               Figure 4.8: Example PDG derived from concrete services and their permissions 
Henceforth, a path A →* B means that information can flow from A to B; likewise if there is no 
path, then it is guaranteed that there is no information flow. As further validated by [28, 29], 
PDGs relate very well to the traditional notion of secure information flow noninterference. 
Noninterference between two security levels, written as d /~> e means that no statement with 
security level d may influence a statement of security level e [28]. This concept maps up well 
even for our case, as no service with security domain d may influence a service of security 
domain e without satisfying the desired conditions needed. 
In Fig. 4.8, ies1 cannot under any circumstances have an influence on tdb1 because no path is 
specified for ies1 to engage or invoke tdb1, similarly for irs1 and arm1. Furthermore, if ors2 
misrepresents or lie about its location when requesting access to mdb1, the access request will be 
denied and mdb1 will set its trust level to a red flag to close the path for information propagation 
to ors2. As a result, both the access control and information flow control policies will fail to 
execute rendering a request denial for ors2 to collaborate with mdb1. As a result, the use of 
PDGs in our work put an emphasis on determining if there is an information propagation from 
service a to service b or whether this is without doubt not the case. 
4.6 Discussion 
We propose a sound prototype that uses Role Based Access Control to monitor requests to access 
resources and uses the concept of Program Dependence Graphs to monitor information 
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propagation once access to the resources or information is granted. Furthermore, our scheme 
takes into account the location and context dependencies in authentication and authorization of 
information flow services in mobile environments. Services are bound to location and context to 
allow the secure flow of information to take place. Path conditions which are necessary 
conditions for information to propagate between services are also introduced. If these path 
conditions are not met, it is guaranteed that there’ll be no information flow. Likewise, if location 
and context are not verified or falsified by the service requestor, no access is granted to resources 







In Chapter 4 we discussed the architecture of our model prototype at a generic level, stating 
components the model employs and how the components should interact. The formulation of the 
model prototype features aspects that need to be implemented so as to verify the security of the 
model both in individual components and as whole. These include implementing or verifying 
how access to resources is achieved, how information propagates between services once that 
access is granted. Furthermore, we look at how PDGs are set to realize the secure flow of 
information. Therefore, in order to assess the overall effectiveness of the prototype design 
described in Chapter 4, a set of experiments were implemented to answer the following questions 
on the model; 
1. How long does it take to generate a tree of passwords? 
2. How to check how secure the model is? 
3. How much time does logging on the system take? 
4. Finally, we test the number of security policy changes when security domain changes. 
5.2 Technologies  
We implement our analyses using an application web server platform called WAMP. WAMP is a 
software bundle running on a Windows platform and consists of an Apache server, MySQL 
database and a scripting language called PHP. We briefly describe each software component 
below; 
 Windows 7: A graphical operating system (OS) developed by Microsoft running on most 
personal computers. 
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 Apache:  This is the most popular Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) server in
deployment on the public internet. It is an open source software which supports a wide
variety of features which are implemented as compiled modules.
 MySQL: This is a multithreaded, multi-user SQL database management system
(DBMS).
 PHP: This is a server-side scripting language designed for web development but also
used as a general purpose programming language. PHP code is interpreted by a web
server via a PHP processor module, which generates the resulting application. PHP
commands can optionally be embedded directly into an HTML source document rather
than calling an external file to process data. We use PHP as the implementation language
for our model.
5.2.1 PHP RBAC 
For relevant ease of implementation, this work uses PHP-RBAC [1] which is a standard NIST 
level 2 Hierarchical Role Based Access Control library implemented as a library for PHP (it is a 
de facto authorization library for PHP). This standard allows perfectly maintainable function 
access control for applications or frameworks. PHP-RBAC relies heavily on an SQL or MySQL 
backend for fastest implementation. Furthermore, this standard provides ease of use and 
reliability.   
5.3 Structure 
For our analyses we created program stubs using PHP to implement a hierarchical RBAC model 
for our native access control. Figure 5.1 below presents the user clearance tree hierarchy and 
Figure 5.2 presents the stubs of code used to implement a tree of passwords or roles for the five 
different users, namely; root, system admin, moderator, public user or normal user and a guest 
user to handle their access to resources as outlined in the comments. The hierarchal RBAC 
model defines an inheritance relation among roles. The model resembles a tree structure with 
root as the tree top inheriting user roles and permissions of subsequent leaves or nodes below 
root. In principle, root has access to all resources. System admin has access to all resources 
below its password clearance level, likewise a moderator and a normal user and finally a guest 
user has access to resources only directly assigned or cleared to access. 
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 // MANAGEMENT TASKS 
 'manageResource0' => ['type' => Item::TYPE_OPERATION, 'description' => 
'...', 'bizRule' => NULL, 'data' => NULL], 
 'manageResource1' => ['type' => Item::TYPE_OPERATION, 'description' => 
'...', 'bizRule' => NULL, 'data' => NULL], 
 'manageResource2' => ['type' => Item::TYPE_OPERATION, 'description' => 
'...', 'bizRule' => NULL, 'data' => NULL], 
 'manageResource3' => ['type' => Item::TYPE_OPERATION, 'description' => 
'...', 'bizRule' => NULL, 'data' => NULL], 
 // CREATING THE HIERACHICAL ROLE/TREE STRUCTURE 
 'guest' => [ 
 'type' => Item::TYPE_ROLE, 
 'description' => 'Guest', 
 'bizRule' => NULL, 
 'data' => NULL 
 ], 
 'user' => [ 
 'type' => Item::TYPE_ROLE, 
 'description' => 'User', 
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        'children' => [ 
            'guest', 
            'manageResource0', // User can edit Resource0 
        ], 
        'bizRule' => 'return !Yii::$app->user->isGuest;', 
        'data' => NULL 
    ], 
 
    'moderator' => [ 
        'type' => Item::TYPE_ROLE, 
        'description' => 'Moderator', 
        'children' => [ 
            'user',         // Can manage all that user can 
            'manageResource1', // and also resource1 
        ], 
        'bizRule' => NULL, 
        'data' => NULL 
    ], 
 
    'admin' => [ 
        'type' => Item::TYPE_ROLE, 
        'description' => 'Admin', 
        'children' => [ 
            'moderator',    // can do all the stuff that moderator can 
            'manageResource2', // and also manage resource2 
        ], 
        'bizRule' => NULL, 
        'data' => NULL 
    ], 
 
    'root' => [ 
        'type' => Item::TYPE_ROLE, 
        'description' => 'Super admin', 
        'children' => [ 
            'admin',        // can do all that admin can 
            'manageResource3', // and also manage resource3 
        ], 
        'bizRule' => NULL, 
        'data' => NULL 
    ], 
 
]; 
Fig. 5.2 Role hierarchy implementation using PHP code 
5.4 Roles and Role assignments 
To enable effective assignment and deployment of roles in the model together with the 
constraints (location and context) bound to the system, we label parameters to handle the 
assignment of roles and permissions in relation to the constraints. For example, we use 
parameters as follows to illustrate roles bound by location/context; 
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   doctor_on_duty(doctor_id, patient_id) and doctor (doctor_id, patient_id) 
   nurse_on_duty(nurse_id, type) and nurse(nurse_id, type) 
The above parameters represent a role bound by location and context which the access control 
decisions depend on and accordingly monitored. doctor_on_duty(…) above presents a role of a 
doctor attending to a certain patient. We can infer that the doctor is on duty (context) and in a 
hospital/clinic (location) where s/he works. doctor() refers to a general doctor x who is 
responsible for treatment of patient y but not on duty. The above distinction of roles is very 
important for the permissions granted or denied the two different roles under a different 
environment and location. The same applies for the nurse role distinction. Each doctor’s context 
is represented as a binary pair 0 or 1. The 0 is an inactivated role, and the 1 is the activated role. 
Likewise we give a binary value for the location, 0 being offsite and 1 being onsite or in the 
hospital/clinic. This role assignment is a database lookup to find whether the person identified by 
the parameter is on duty or not. Therefore, three elements must be verified for the authentication 
of a doctor requesting data resources to happen. First, s/he must be a local user (registered in the 
system), must be an employed practitioner and finally must be on duty or not. Access is then 
granted depending on what context the request to resources is based on. This access control 
policy expresses therefore that a person can act in the ‘doctor on duty’ role as long as he is on 
duty, has activated the ‘local user’ role, and has been appointed as an employed practitioner. This 
assignment of roles is mutually exclusive, meaning no one user can assume both roles at the 
same time or the same user is not allowed to take both roles. 
For role, permission, enforcements and check assignments, we use functions to smoothly execute 
these tasks. Standard Role Based Access Control functionality gives dynamic easy to handle 
methods for executing tasks such as role-permission assignments, revocations, and verifying 
authorizations. The following functions were used to implement the above tasks. See Figure 5.3 
below.  
 
     
    public function assign($role, $permission) 
    { 
        return Jf::$Rbac->assign($role, $permission); 
    } 
 
    public function check($permission, $user_id) 
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    { 
        return Jf::$Rbac->check($permission, $user_id); 
    } 
 
    public function enforce($permission, $user_id) 
    { 
        return Jf::$Rbac->enforce($permission, $user_id); 
    } 
Fig.5.3 Code snippet for a RBAC functionality assignment of roles, permissions, check and enforcement 
 Function assign is used to assign permissions to roles and returns the permissions 
assigned to a role. 
 Function check is used to check what permissions belong to a user and returns those 
permissions. 
 Function enforce is used to enforce permissions to a user and if the permission enforced 
is true, it is returned otherwise it is false. 
5.5 Administration of RBAC 
The implementation of rules in the system is defined by using simple user to role-domain 
mappings. Each user is assigned a role in a particular domain under a particular context. We also 
define RBAC administration functions to manage access and/or management of assets in an 
authorized domain. We use the following functions to enforce these operations; 
  can_manage_UR(ur (uar, d)) indicates that only a super user (root) in the system can manage     
the assignment of user roles (uar) in domain d. 
  has_access_UA(user_id, type) indicates that user with user_id x and of type y can access 
resources in that particular domain. Or user _id x type y has access to resources in that particular 
domain. As an example, the function below returns the query result of a selected user with 
user_id and of user_type 1 (which is an administrator in this case) who has access to particular 
resources. 
        function has_access($user_id, $type) 
    { 
 $user_id  = (int)$user_id; 
 $type   = (int)$type; 
  
 return (mysql_result(mysql_query("SELECT COUNT(`user_id`) 
       FROM `users` WHERE   `user_id` = $user_id AND `type` = $type"), 0) ==   1) ? 
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true : false; 
} 
Fig.5.4: sample function that returns an authorized admin user 
Figure 5.5 shows a function that protects user admin page/resources by checking the user’s id 
and type authorization clearance to that particular page. If user’s id and type is matched to 1, 
access is granted else denied.  Figure 5.6 on the other hand verifies if a user is authenticated first 
in order to be granted permission to access a certain resource page. If not the user is denied 
permission to that particular resource page. 
function admin_protect() { 
global $user_data; 
if (has_access($user_data['user_id'], 1) === false) { 
  header('Location: index.php'); 
  exit(); 
   } 
} 
Fig.5.5: a sample function that protects resources authorized to admin users 
function protect_page() { 





Fig.5.6: sample function authentication verification for a resource page 
5.7 Discussion 
This chapter presented the implementation of our model design outlined in Chapter 4 and the 
experiments undertaken to test the security of the model. The main focus of the chapter was 
looking at how our role based access control system is implemented and tested, as well as the 
location and context dependencies for authentication and authorization for secure information 
flow. The role hierarchies and their inheritance give direction of how information flows between 





Results and Evaluation  
Evaluation of access and information flow control in mobile web services is an important aspect 
of  this work because, not only do we focus on the security aspect of the work but also include 
the performance of the model taking into account the limitations brought by the constrained 
environments. In an attempt to understand the broad view of mobile web service compositions in 
resource constrained environments taking into considerations location and context dependencies 
in authentication and authorization for information flow, we classify and evaluate our model 
using four major dimensions: security of the access control scheme, performance, response time 
and failure rates. Furthermore, the experiments conducted bordered on evaluating the CIA5-triad 
of the work. 
6.1 Experimental Results 
As highlighted in Section 5.1, we carried out experiments to study the performance of our 
prototype model in relation to finding solutions to tasks such as; how much time does password 
generation takes, how much time does login takes, checking or verification of  security and the 
length of passwords the system employs under different environments and success rates. In this 
chapter we present and analyze the results and findings of the experiments carried out in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. We particularly make analysis on the countermeasures employed, Response 
Time and Performance of the system.  
6.1.1 Experimental setup 
As discussed in section 5.2 above, we use a role based access control system in which each data 
resource is assigned a security class (protection) and each service assigned a clearance level by 
each domain [103]. The security class measures the security and trust levels and offers protection 
to the data resources required with regards to who is cleared to access the resources. To qualify 
the security class levels to the user hierarchy defined in section 5.2 we define multiple security 
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class levels as, No Protection (NP) – Guest, Low Protection (LP) – User, Medium Protection 
(MP) – Moderator, Medium High Protection (MHP) – Administrator and High Protection (HP) – 
Root where NP < LP < MP < MHP < HP [103]. Our simple access control policy considers that a 
request is only granted if the clearance level (from NP to HP) of the requesting service or user is 
greater than or equal to the security class of the requested resource data. For instance an admin 
user (MHP) can only be granted access to resources equal or below his security clearance level 
(from LP to MHP) and not HP. For experimental purposes, we use the administrator user’s login 
credentials to test if access to protected resource pages for guests, normal user and moderator 
users is granted or not. We also test for the HP security clearance using the administrator’s 
credentials. 
We use two role parameters or labels for each user as discussed in Section 5.3 to illustrate 
location and context dependencies of the access control for secure information flow. For 
simplicity we give access to a download link to illustrate information flow control based on the 
user’s defined role parameter. Therefore, if access is denied to the download link it means 
information cannot flow otherwise if granted then the secure flow of information is permissible. 
To illustrate changes in security domains we conduct our tests under two Wi-Fi network 
environments; unsecured and secured networks. We first use a non-secured or open Wi-Fi 
network environment to test the security of our model on how robust the authentication and 
authorization mechanisms employed when for instance a moderator user logs in under this 
environment. We do this test to verify if say, an adversary snooping over the network trying to 
steal login credentials can be able to gain access to the system with having obtained the right 
credentials but under different location and context. Tests to evaluate the authentication 
mechanisms such as correct username and password length and complexity are carried out. We 
also test how long logging into the system takes, granted or denied under this network 
environment.  
Similarly, we conduct the same test under a secured Wi-Fi network domain. We secure the Wi-Fi 
network using a Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) Enterprise security mode with an Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) WPA Algorithm type using a minimum 9 character security key for 
the password. Therefore, under this network users have to authenticate first to the network by 
giving the correct username and password (security key) to be connected to the Wi-Fi network. 
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Moreover, we also test for failure rates and response time (Section 6.1.2) when moving from one 
network to another. Therefore, a user logs in under a secured network and moves to a non-
secured network or vice versa. This we do to check if there will be any interruptions on the 
service (both in authentication and downloading) caused by the change in domain and if so what 
they are. 
6.1.2 Countermeasures 
In order to keep away unwanted users or adversaries to gaining access to the system, we 
employed countermeasures as presented in Section 3.6 on authentication and authorization by 
using a robust access control mechanism (RBAC) for our login. The login page is the first entry 
point to the system, so we used this same page as a first line of defense to attackers by directing 
users on a compulsory registration step for first time users. Thereafter, users were assigned and 
grouped to roles and a strict username and password combination bound with a role had to be 
satisfied to allow users to be logged in.  
Experiment: Mimic unauthorized access. This experiment was conducted to test how the 
system handles confidentiality of users or services’ secret or sensitive data, like login credentials 
and profiles. 
Methodology: We mimic unauthorized access to the system by first trying to gain access to the 
system by supplying or using unregistered user credentials to login. This process was tested by 
using a combination of five different user credential combinations.  
Results: Figure 6.1 gives a snapshot of the results returned each time unknown or invalid login 
credentials are supplied to the system. This error authentication mechanism acts a first line of 
defense to resources used or found in the system to prevent illegitimate accesses to resources by 




Figure 6.1: Error message for unlawful login credentials  
 
Figure 6.2: Protected assets error message for unauthorized user 
to trigger a download from a database. In addition to testing unauthorized accesses to the system 
and resources, login times had to be verified to test how fast it took authentication to occur. We 
measured the number of successful logins against the time it took for a successful login to take 
place. In Figure 6.3 we compare these two elements and show the average time for a successful 
login occurrence under the two security domains; open network and secured network 
respectively. The comparison is fundamentally based on the performance of the authentication 





As can be seen, the results obtained in Fig.6.3 indicate that the login time under an open network 
took little time compared to the login time success rate under a secured network. Although the 
  
Figure 6.1:  
difference between the results is very close; the factors that may contribute to this behavior 
cannot be ignored. Under the secured network, apart from the application authentication taking 
place the device has to authenticate to the network at the same time. These parallel processes 
occurring at the same time can contribute to the slight sluggish exchange of requests and 
responses under this domain. Thus the device may use or consume a bit more resources to 
execute the logging in session than the whole authentication process taking place under the open 
or unsecured network domain. Although the success rate is high irrespective of which domain it 
is carried out, the results doesn’t in any way demonstrate a weak authentication and authorization 
mechanism employed by the system. In fact, the results show that irrespective of which domain a 
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Figure 6.3 Login success rate versus time (s) between the two security domains 
Success Rate 
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6.1.2.1 Response Time 
Experiment: query user profile: Once access is granted to the system, we measured or tested 
the response time made for queries by taking the number of queries made versus the time it took 
for a query result to be shown. These queries were made to the backend MySQL database. For 
easy experimentation, we query a user’s profile from the database. Note that the database is a 
federated database because services are concretized from different databases across multiple 
domains. Thus the queried service is a composite service. We do not measure the service 
composition time in this work.  
Methodology:  We measure the response time by comparing the number of queries made against 
the time taken for each query response under the two different security domains. For instance, 
the user’s profile is made up of the user’s details (gender, age, and color), “allergies”, “and 
chronic illnesses” all from different databases in different domains. Therefore, running such 
queries under different domains helps display the integrity of the data kept in the federated 
database or composed service.  
We don’t measure the time for the service to compose, however, the composing services are the 
different medical data or information being gathered from different health centers (hospitals and 
clinics) to form a medical record for an individual patient on the EMR service. Thus we make the 
assumption that the federated database is already populated or concretized by the composing 
databases. Therefore we make queries of the composed service to determine inconsistence or 
consistence to the queries made. 
Results: The mean response time taken to generate search query result sets is shown in Figure 
6.4. In order to ascertain the overall distribution of the search query response times, the time 




Figure 6.4:  Number of queries versus time (s) to respond to a query 
Discussion: The results in Figure 6.4 indicate an increase almost linear correlation between the 
number of queries submitted and the query response time. This is due to the fact that as the 
workload increases the time for a query result to be returned also increases depending on how 
large the search query data required is. This linear increase is evident in both tasks under the two 
different networks. Therefore, this consistent return shows the integrity aspect of the system (that 
the same size or amount of data queried yields the same result showing no tampering of data size 
or amount) as expected that when the workload doubles, so does the response time regardless of 
which security domain the query is carried out from. Moreover, the results confirm that no 
matter where the query is made from (domain), the same size or slightly smaller/bigger output 
result will be obtained proving no meddling or interference with the data hence integrity 
preserved. 
6.2.1.2 Performance  
The purpose of the following experiment was to determine the impact the number of security 
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Experiment: number of security changes. This experiment was conducted to ascertain the 
number of security changes that occur in a given time frame when a service is queried under a 
specific security domain and moved to a different domain. The aim of this experiment was to test 
the impact elements like response time and response failure rates have on the performance of the 
system. 
Methodology: In order to get the best results for our test, we conducted this experiment using a 
cross domain hop. Here a query is started in one domain and then moved to a different domain to 
check the availability of the system session when this hop occurs. The aim was to determine if a 
session will be lost or a new session is required for both authentication and authorization for the 
session to continue so as to determine how robust the access control scheme is when security 
domain changes or a session is interrupted in terms of requiring the user to re-authenticate or not. 
Also, we try to determine how long it takes for a particular session to fail or pass during this 
domain hop or change. 
Results: the results of the above experiment are shown in Table 6.1 below.   
Table 6.1 
Network No. of policy changes Time (ms) 
Secured 1. Authentication 
2. Authorization 





Unsecured/Open 0 0 
 
Discussion: The results in Table 6.1 indicate that a significant amount of time is spent with 
respect to time to respond when policy changes occur from an open network to a secured 
network domain for each corresponding change. However, the opposite yields a zero time 
response. This outcome is largely due to the fact that when the change from a secured to an open 
network takes place, the system and/or device automatically picks up the open network with no 
form of authentication required to enable or determine a new session taking place. Consequently, 
when the opposite is true, the system and/or device require some form of authentication to 
register to the new network (secured) to enable a session to take place. Hence, a number of 
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policy changes occur during this period since the users and devices entering this (secured) 
domain have to be legitimate users to allow them to execute their tasks. This change in policies 
impacts the performance of the system in terms of availability, because as the change in security 
domain occurs the system stops or terminates whatever session it started in the open network. 
Therefore, a new session requires authentication and authorization of users to enable them access 
to resources. 
 
6.2 Analysis of Results 
The results of the experiments carried out in this work helped confirm the following issues with 
regards to performance and security of our prototype or model; 
 The model produces a fined grained Role Based Access Control for Information Flow 
control with location and context dependencies. 
 Changes in security domain impact the authentication and authorization policies of the 
model and the way information is released to requestors. 
 A dynamic access control model is relevant for dynamic web environments where policy 
changes are both instantaneous and ad hoc. 
Although this work’s interest wasn’t on testing service composition protocol success per se, 
however, its implementation bordered around or was aligned on results and work done by She 
et.al. on the background. The results obtained in this work are of paramount importance as a 
breakthrough or first take analysis on binding an access control model, in our case RBAC to 
constraints like location and context as dependencies for authentication and authorization for 
secure information flow in dynamic environments. 
Moreover, the countermeasures employed for bridging the access control mechanism (RBAC) 
prove the preservation of confidentiality of users and services’ sensitive information. Likewise, 
the consistent results obtained when measuring integrity confirm that the right path for secure 
flow of information is upheld or adhered to. Finally, high failure rates experienced when hopping 
from an unsecured domain to a secured one illustrate that unwarranted users can’t be granted 
access to resources thus proving illegitimate flow of information. Also, this result shows the 
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unavailability of the system to all users in general which is, though critical it is frustrating to 
experience.  
The threat model presented in Chapter 3 helped to define a set of possible attacks considered for 
our prototype. These attacks included but not limited to shoulder surfing, brute force attack 
against the access control scheme, eavesdropping on the network.  Results obtained after testing 
against these attacks provided or proved how robust the security of the model is. For instance, 
results obtained from performing shoulder attacks, using unauthorized login credentials showed 
the robustness of the access control scheme with unauthorized logins prevented from occurring. 
However, aspects like availability were proven to be hard to achieve considering the 
unavailability of a service when moving from one security domain to another. However, this also 
allowed for unlawful flows of information between services not to be realized as a result 
because, as soon as the service is unavailable, the session was simply terminated with no request 

















This thesis has examined security guarantees in securing mobile web services using access and 
information flow control. Specifically, using RBAC, location and context dependencies for both 
authentication and authorization for information flow control as outlined in Chapter 4. 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 defines the methods used for implementation of the model used in 
guaranteeing security for web services in the mobile sphere. The results in Chapter 6 provides a 
good measure of the security or arguably how our model prototype secures or takes care of the 
CIA-triad in mobile web service environments. Above all, we tested aspects like response time, 
both on performance of the system in totality and individual elements such as authentication and 
authorization mechanisms. 
7.1 Summary 
The results helped us address or confirm that in dynamically changing security environments or 
domains, different security policies come to play with different actors or players, however, all 
participating players (services) must agree on basic security policies/terms in order to compose a 
secure solution for a service requestor. On the other hand, the results showed that when the 
participating services don’t agree on the basic security policies in order to compose, the session 
is dropped indefinitely because of untrusted services wanting to compromise the desired 
composed service. Consequently, the user/service’s context and location is taken in account 
when processing the said request. This means, access and manipulations to resources is given 
only when the right context and user’s whereabouts are satisfied or fulfilled as shown in results 
obtained in Chapter 6. 
Security assurance is critical to the success of information sharing in any environment. Our 
formal RBAC model bound by location and context dependencies for authentication and 
authorization for information flow control is intended to address this critical aspect of 
information sharing in dynamically changing security environments. Our research and concept 
prototype shows that it is possible to provide a security framework for mobile or resource 
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constrained environments with flexible, dynamic service composition characteristics. Our 
security model is an improvement over other models in that, first; the service or user’s 
surroundings and physical location are considered or bound with the user’s role in making 
authentication and authorization decisions to access and manipulate resources. Second, 
information flow decisions are based on a concept previously used in program statements, 
Program Dependence Graphs which features path conditions for information to be allowed to 
propagate from one service to the next. This concept is a first of its kind to be used in a mobile 
web service platform other than in type systems. A third feature for this security model is our 
usage of a hierarchical structure to govern access to resources, although this method is not a 
novelty, its usage helps tightens the security of our model. Therefore, our approach provides a 
fine and simple secure access control scheme which gives access to resources by allowing 
multiple roles, which uses the same resources in different environments, to have different 
invocation of service constraints without violating the minimum security requirements set. 
The relevance of this work can be applied directly to Electronic Health Record systems or any 
other information sharing applications in mobile web services or over the Internet where 
executing necessary tasks requires interaction between systems and shared databases with 
location and context dependencies for access to resources regarded as necessary constraints. This 
work has demonstrated success in this area by way of a potential use of a system that can be used 
in a federation or coalition, where the need to dynamically combine users and resources while at 
the same time maintaining information assurance is critical. Explicitly, we have met the goals of: 
 Binding RBAC to location and context. The objective here was to use or develop a 
RBAC model that uses location and context reliance for authentication and authorization 
for secure information flow in mobile web environments particularly using an EHR 
system. 
 Establishing or using PDGs for information flow control. Our objective here was to use 
PDGs with path conditions to allow for secure information flow between services and 
users. This was accomplished by our security prototype or framework design. We were 
successful in using this approach to build a very fine-grained information flow between 
services by user context. Moreover, path conditions are critical in ensuring unlawful or 
unwanted flow and exchange of information between users and services. 
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Finally, this work proves to be a good and valid presentation of a model that can be adopted in 
securing mobile service compositions in resource constrained environments because security 
techniques like confidentiality, integrity and availability are addressed, which are critical aspects 
of any security aware service.   
7.2 Future Work 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are ongoing efforts dedicated to secure web services by using 
both access control and information flow control in the same context, [102, 103] but using 
different approaches or methods. Breakthrough work by [103] illustrates the need to have such 
systems in place in different security domains. Following the path or solution laid down by this 
work, our future work would like to find solutions to scale down models for service 
compositions to handle mobile service environments without putting heavy resource demands in 
overhead computation power and bandwidth in mobile web service domains. This includes easy 
and quick ways to compose services, and easy but robust access control schemes for this 
environment. Ideally, the results of this work offers an opportunity to explore other access 
control schemes (like attribute based access control) that can be explored for mobile 
environments with location and context dependencies in authentication and authorizations for 
information flow control in resource constrained environments. 
This thesis has provided a new model and techniques for providing security for mobile web 
services in resource constrained environments. Providing better security for mobile web services 
in these environments is a challenging and important problem for future computing 
environments. Moreover, these environments are likely to be large and distributed and to contain 
untrusted users, services and domains. This problem has not received as much attention as it 
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